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Failing Banks and Sporty Bankers

MICHAEL HARRIS



Teen-Age Aristocracy

Frank Musgrove

Good Samaritans

Law and the Golden Rule

Lois Wille

HISTORY RECONSTRUCTED

The Carpetbagger's New Clothes

Bernard A. Weisberger

How Many Germanys?

Paul Wohl

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LETTERS

Army preachers

Arlington, Va.

Dear Sirs: First, an addendum to Robert G. Sherrill's "Bob Jones University: New Curricula for Bigotry" [*The Nation*, Mar. 29]. Ministerial graduates of Bob Jones University are on duty as chaplains with the Armed Services. . . .

Second, a suggestion that the selection system used by the Armed Forces Chaplains Board and its several advisory commissions might stand some airing. Quotas for chaplains are allocated on the basis of denominational strength in the United States, and this insures the assignment of a relatively high number of Fundamentalist chaplains for military service. The shortage of pastors needed to serve liberal Christian and Hebrew congregations further aggravates the situation by making available vacancies which are apparently filled from denominations with more depth in ministerial resources.

Finally, a minor note of hope. An enterprising service flock is occasionally successful in converting a Fundamentalist preacher to a more tolerant religious faith. . . . *Gerald Pagano*

Brooklyn, N.Y.

Dear Sirs: Robert Sherrill's description of Bob Jones University is a brilliantly sardonic piece on a much neglected subject. The alliance between Fundamentalism and reaction on the one hand and bigotry on the other is the most important facet of the Southern political structure. . . . There is nothing more difficult than to convince someone of anything when he knows that God is on his side. Anyone questioning the gospel is a heretic. . . . Not only does this type of belief naturally align itself with the far Right; it also helps explain the good-and-evil mentality of that shade of politics, which is the point of Mr. Sherrill's essay. *Harold Tobman*

The war cure

Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Sirs: Fighting among animals is directly related to population pressure. . . . Fighting among societies in defense of territory is also universal, including primitive man. Ceremonial killing, including war, serves as a release of density-fostered hostility, reduces availability of breeding males in adjacent societies. . . .

War, then, is the ultimate form of population control, and will always be resorted to when others fail. . . .

Thus your editorial, "The Hawks and the President" [*The Nation*, Apr. 12], is questionable; population pressure emanating from countries such as China will probably result in the application of the ultimate form of population control, which in our age is the hydrogen bomb. These comments of mine are, of course, to be interpreted as descriptive rather than normative. Man can, in time, devise better solutions to this problem, but I question that sufficient time will be available to us. *Richard M. Titus*

Wagner holds the fort

New York City

Dear Sirs: Anyone who has lived in New York City for any length of time must readily grant Jack Newfield's premise that Mayor Wagner is a woefully inept administrator ["There Sits Mayor Wagner," *The Nation*, Mar. 15]. Nobody with any sense of proportion, however, will grant his conclusion that we should or even can afford to replace him. That clique of corrupt bosses abetted by a few fair-weather reformers who imported a Senator for us pretty well locked decent New Yorkers into Wagner. . . . Those shortsighted enough to join Mr. Newfield in straining at the Wagner gnat should prepare to swallow the Kennedy camel. *Donald J. Miller*

Puzzled German

Hagen, West Germany

Dear Sirs: I am looking for an American who can tell me, a German, what the war in Vietnam is about. Perhaps there is a reader of your magazine who is willing to give me the facts.

As far as I know, in 1946, Ho Chi Minh was the ruler of all Vietnam and was negotiating with France in that capacity. . . . As far as I know, the Geneva Agreements, Section 7, stipulated that in July, 1956, elections were to be held in both parts of Vietnam leading to the formation of a unified Vietnamese government, and said that the 17th Parallel was not a boundary line between two countries but simply a line of demarcation to be used in demobilizing the troops. . . .

As far as I know, it was former President Eisenhower who wrote in *The White House Years*:

I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs, who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader.

And as far as I know, it was Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson who made a sharp statement back in 1955:

It would be wrong to send American GIs into the mud and muck of Indo-China on a bloodletting spree to perpetuate colonialism and the white man's exploitation in Asia.

So what is the truth about the war in Southeast Asia? Who is right? Who is wrong? . . . *Friedrich Jaeger*

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The Rediscovery of the UN

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, like certain other consorts of royal ladies, is a very conscientious fellow, and well informed on all sorts of industrial and governmental matters. When, the other day, he was called on to speak at the University of Michigan, he gave much better value, in return for his honorary degree, than is usual on such occasions. Democracy, he pointed out, is not for the indifferent, for those who feel that those in authority should solve the problems and leave the citizen to his own concerns. Perhaps this was true once, Prince Bernhard went on, "but the problems which face those in authority, whether in parliament or in government or in other high stations in life in our modern world, *prove to be beyond their powers of solution since they involve the whole of mankind.*" (Italics added.)

Prince Bernhard was not speaking particularly of the United Nations, but this statement could hardly have been more apropos in that connection. Indeed, after the impasse at the last session of the General Assembly, it is clearer than ever before that an international body, even when limited to an ancillary role, is indispensable to the solution of international problems. The UN's past failures and frustrations are the strongest testimony to its value: when it failed, the reason was that it intervened in situations so desperate that intervention seemed imperative, and it was defeated by the very nationalistic passions it had been founded to control.

Discerning observers see this clearly, and have no intention of writing off the UN. Its vitality will be restored to the extent that the great powers cease using it as instrument of their cold-war objectives. "International events of recent weeks," Sen. George Aiken of Vermont told his colleagues late in March, "seem to have overwhelmed the capacity of this government for affirmative action, except in the military field." He was referring to Vietnam, but then he reminded the Senate that when the United States had turned the screws on the Russians (and the French) in an effort to stigmatize them as delinquent debtors in the Congo operation, he and other Senators had sought to learn from the Department of State what the American reaction would be if the General Assembly were to send a UN force into some area in which American interests were involved on the other side. Would the United States pay up? The State Department would not even discuss the question and, considering what its policies have been, the evasiveness is understandable.

When the Russians stood fast, the United States decided that to wreck the UN would not be in our interest. Rep. Henry Reuss of Wisconsin has recently given several practical reasons for revivifying the UN as speedily and thoroughly as possible. If the Vietnam conflict does not expand into a general war and the belligerents are eventually dragged by self-interest to the negotiating table, the UN will be needed to further peace-making efforts, to administer the aid program envisioned by President Johnson, to supervise an election if one is agreed on, and to take care of other contingencies that may arise. Mr. Reuss suggests that the United States should cease its futile invocation of Article 19 of the UN Charter. The Aiken and Reuss moves may have Administration backing. If not, they should have.

Listen to the Marine

As the war expands in Vietnam, a ray of light is beginning to pierce the fog of rhetoric and double talk. Never have American intellectuals been more critical of the actions of their government or more outspoken in calling for magnanimity and reason. It goes far to vindicate the contention of the late Prof. Paul Baran that a true intellectual must be a social critic. The movement has spread from the academic halls into the citadels of conformity: in one of the numerous open letters to the President printed as advertisements in the newspapers, the Industrial and Research Scientists Committee on Vietnam, composed at the outset largely of staff people at Bell Telephone Laboratories and International Business Machines Corporation, not only forcibly indicted American policy but refrained from seizing the opportunity to jump on Mr. Johnson's April bandwagon. The scientists coolly informed the President that their letter was in type before his speech of April 7, but that they had taken note of it and hoped "it will lead to action in accordance with the views expressed above."

Since these views were based on the contention that we "are waging an immoral and inhumane war" on the majority of the people of Vietnam, it is not likely that the appeal will be heeded; nevertheless it represents a significant extension of the intellectual revulsion against the kind of war we have been waging in Vietnam—and against the American stance in the cold war, of which Vietnam is only one front. Though spectacular results are hardly to be expected, these outcries do have an effect, and it is not negligible. In *The New York Times* of April 8, Max Frankel lists the clamor of the intellectuals as one of the pressures which led to the April 7 speech. This should provide some encouragement, but only for a redoubled effort and that for a long time to come.

Since only a small minority will heed the words of reason and humanity, the intellectuals must involve themselves still more. They, and all of their persuasion, may take a lesson also from one not of their own—the U.S. Marine commander at Danang, Brig.

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Gen. Frederick J. Karch. Asked if he would like to see the Marines assume a more aggressive role, he replied, "Did you ever see a Marine that didn't like an aggressive role?" His not to reason why. The intellectual's fate is to reason. He also has a mission, and because it is more complex and difficult he must carry it out with even greater tenacity and courage.

If, despite the intellectuals' remonstrances, the war continues to expand, we must be prepared for a recrudescence of McCarthyism. It flourished in the period of the Korean War and will almost surely break out again as the domestic phase of a major conflict. The usual queue of demagogues is waiting.

Through the Back Door

For better or worse, the education bill is now law. On the whole it would seem that it is for the better, but the President is probably taking a simplistic view when he describes it only as "the revolution of the spirit against the tyranny of ignorance."

The fact of cardinal importance is the recognition of the need for federal investment in education—on a massive scale. In the next five years, nearly $7 billion will flow out of Washington into almost all of the more than 3,000 counties of the United States. Not all of it will reach the schools, and the flow will be uneven—almost a flood here, not much more than a trickle there. The overall effects, however, are bound to be formidable, and in some respects unpredictable at this stage of the program.

The share of each state and locality will depend on the number of poor ("economically disadvantaged") children in the area, and on the amount the state is already spending per pupil on its public schools. To a certain extent, therefore, the program is based on the Biblical principle that to him that hath shall be given. In fiscal 1966, California is due to receive more than $92 million, Texas about $86 million, New York almost $100 million. However, the formulas provide quite generous aid for the Southern states, most of which are in the $30 million bracket.

These sums can benefit the young, and through them the entire country, in significant ways. By focusing on children living in poverty the law strikes at one of the fundamental weaknesses of the American educational system. A more adequate supply of textbooks, library books and services, and a variety of teaching aids, will become available. The $70 million earmarked for research and assistance to state agencies may begin to build these generally weak bureaucracies into planning bodies with real functions and leadership potential.

But in many areas the effects, if not the intent, of the law are vague and remain to be worked out. Some of the most farsighted and progressive members of both the House and Senate had their doubts about the measure even while they were voting for it. One reservation is the fear that it may strengthen private schools and weaken the public school system. Corollary to this is the problem of maintaining separation between the government and established religion. This problem has in effect been passed from the national to the local level, where it can become enmeshed in local politics, with possibly divisive results. In some areas anti-Catholic feeling may be dominant; in some, segments of the community that are not primarily interested in the public schools may seek to take over their control. But the bill will no doubt be reviewed in the courts, and that will settle the issue of how far Congress can go under the First Amendment in giving aid to private schools.

The American way of doing things, where federal and local power is involved, is to debate and procrastinate almost endlessly, then legislate with a whoop and a holler. The precedent was followed in this case, partly because of the opportunity to tie education into the elimination-of-poverty program, partly because it is congenial to the President's temperament. As Senator Morse put it: "We are going into Federal aid for elementary and secondary schools . . . through the backdoor." Theoretically this may not be the best entrance, but politically it seems to have been effective. In any case, a great opportunity has been created; it will, however, call for close surveillance at every turn.

Poverty's Wars

Federal aid to education and the war against poverty are not only related but their development shows a similar *mélange* of internecine conflict, all in the fine old American tradition. A certain amount of such contention is to be expected, whether here or in any other part of the globe, and may indeed be regarded as evidence of national vitality. However, to prevent confusion from getting out of hand, it seems desirable to sort out the principal areas of conflict and the warring factions.

Inconclusively but bloodily, like the Marne in World War I, unending battle is being waged between Washington and the city-hall politicians of all the metropolitan centers, great and small. Washington is represented by Sargent Shriver's Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), brash, fresh, growing and imbued with the old Kennedy clan spirit, even if only by marriage. City hall senses economic opportunity too, for deserving Democrats—and perhaps a few Republicans: is not poverty bipartisan? City hall insists on the "control factor"—that is, none of the programs can be permitted to benefit the poor without also benefiting city hall.

Some fairly juicy patronage is at stake. In Paterson, N.J., for instance, the head of the anti-poverty program is drawing $22,000 a year to lift up the poor, of which the federal government pays $16,000. The overall conflict tends to pit the rank and file of the poor, or such leaders as they can find, against the brass hats, whether chosen in Washington or locally. Defending himself against charges of centralism, but possibly adding to the confusion, Mr. Shriver argues that "the people" in New York City, Detroit

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or Wichita "can do a much better job of selecting local groups to participate than federal bureaucrats." With this thesis all will agree, but the war will go on.

Then there is the war between the old-line social agencies, who feel they have the expertise, and perhaps also a justified vested interest in various phases of the program. They were there first, and they tend to feud with Shriver's upstarts. This war rages also in Washington, between the Shriverites and the bureaucrats of the older, established federal agencies.

Some of the agencies that are now set up in cities dole out funds to smaller agencies, which may subsidize still smaller groups and, ultimately, the individually poor. These last will take what is granted them, but among the agencies there is great carnage. Some, getting little satisfaction at the local level, wish to apply directly to Washington for funds.

It all sums up to the fact that there is a lot of money in poverty, and everyone senses that more is coming. Will poverty's wars frustrate the war against poverty itself? Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, professing himself apprehensive of such a miscarriage, is conducting an investigation through his House Labor Committee. He is involved in the control battles and fault may be found with him on other counts, but he is no fool. The experts on poverty will await his findings with interest. So will the poor, with perhaps even more eager anticipation.

The Technological Dilemma

In his review of space books (*The Nation,* March 29) Philip Morrison acknowledged the wastefulness of the moon race but added that, grand or tawdry (actually it is both), it is "our voyage to the Indies and our Passage." Also by way of consolation it should be noted that although the perversions of technology are innumerable, beneficial "fallout" does occur. These effects are unpredictable. The wireless engineers of the first decade of the century could not foresee that the primitive techniques with which they were struggling, refined and elaborated by fifty years of evolution, would bridge the gap between engineering and medicine and promise vast benefits to mankind.

Some of these procedures and devices are already saving lives. Among the developments that were discussed at the symposium of biomedical engineering at the recent convention of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers was the cardiac pacemaker. The numerous malfunctions of that marvelous but mortal instrument, the mammalian heart, include the condition known as heart block, in which the electrical stimulus from the two upper chambers, the auricles, fails to reach the two lower chambers, the ventricles. The latter usually continue to contract, but the normal synchronous action is disrupted and pumping capacity is lowered—or lost entirely. To correct this impairment, cardiac pacemakers can be implanted in the chest. Six thousand units of one design, developed at the School of Medicine of the State University of New York, have been commercially manufactured and more than 2,000 are in clinical use.

The accounts of the problems faced by the engineers and physicians working in this and allied fields read like the post-mortems after a space-flight failure. The electronic pacemaker is simpler than the subsystems of a space vehicle, but it contains batteries to supply power, transistors for amplification and control, transformers, resistors, capacitors, etc. These components are military types, fairly reliable to begin with; by assiduous research, failure rates have been further reduced to a few hundredths or thousandths of 1 per cent per 1,000 hours of operation. Yet the failure of one tiny element may be fatal for the patient, and the engineers and doctors are engaged in arduous experiments to push performance to a higher level. This entire development could hardly have come to realization without the frivolities of television, the glamour of space exploration, and military needs.

The physicians and engineers engaged in cardiac research are confident that within a few years they can develop an operational artificial heart for human beings whose own hearts have been irreversibly damaged. One cannot appreciate what a wonderful machine the physiologic heart is until one tries to replace it with an electronic-mechanical device, but progress is being made toward solving the problems of power supply, implantation, durability, avoidance of clotting, and automatic control. Numerous laboratories are engaged in animal experimentation in this field. Dogs and calves have survived for more than twenty-four hours with artificial hearts, and most failures have been the result of mechanical breakdown. The problems are difficult, but no more so than sending a manned spacecraft to the moon.

As Dr. Morrison says, we cannot afford to stifle the new because the land lacks justice. Like the old, the new comprises both good and evil. The progressive and the humanist will not try to halt technological progress; they will strive to divert it into civilized channels.

Loophole for Vengeance

The Vermont House has approved a bill abolishing capital punishment and sent it to Governor Hoff, who has announced that he "looks forward to" signing it. Vermont thus becomes the ninth state to outlaw legal execution.

There is, however, a proviso in the Vermont bill: persons who are convicted of two unconnected murders or who kill a policeman or prison guard may be electrocuted if the jury so recommends. This is more than an exception, it is a basic weakness; for the ban on capital punishment is a moral commitment and not subject to qualification. Anyone who commits more than one murder is perhaps an object of peculiar loathing (he is also probably insane), and the killing of police officers is traditionally viewed with special severity (particularly by the police themselves). But there are other peculiarly horrible forms of homicide

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—indeed the taking of life is almost invariably horrible, which is why governments the world over are abolishing capital punishment—and as long as any exceptions are left on the books, primitive vengeance will demand more. We believe that if the Vermont legislature really means to ban capital punishment, it will eventually have to pass a bill that bans it.

The False Analogy

Ranking with "appeasement" is the equally hallowed analogy of the identity of Fascist and Communist dictatorships. The ideological infrastructure goes something like this: The USSR is a dictatorship. Red China is a dictatorship. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were dictatorships, and we had to fight them. *Ergo,* it follows that sooner or later we must fight the Russians and the Chinese—and better now than later. The only alternative is to confront them with military strength so overwhelming, coupled with resolution so implacable, that they will surrender unconditionally.

The identity theorem is offered with one slight qualification. Although the Communists are Red Fascists, the original form of Fascist dictatorship is comparatively innocuous. We get along fine with dictatorships all over the world, including outright Fascist ones like Salazar's or Franco's. It is only Red fascism that makes our Joe McCarthys, Dodds, Zablockis, et al., foam at the mouth and the more genteel Rusks, Bundys and Rostows summon up their most steely fortitude.

The difference between fascism and communism was pointed out decades ago by scholars, among them Isaac Deutscher, who could not possibly be accused of fellow-traveling. It is true that neither the USSR nor China (nor the Soviet satellites who are behaving less and less as satellites should) is a capitalist democracy. There the truth ends and we enter the realm of sacred myth. The plain fact is that the USSR and China—and Cuba for that matter—are social revolutionary regimes. Good or bad, they *are* that. All arose from intolerable social conditions and all tried to correct these conditions with a measure of social creativity. Men like Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung—Stalin even, according to Deutscher—are not to be compared with Hitler and Mussolini, who never had a social philosophy but were bent simply and solely on rapine and conquest. Their regimes were totally unregenerate: if Nazism had lasted a thousand years, as Hitler boasted it would, its evil would have been as ineradicable at the end as at the beginning. This prognosis has been applied to the Communist dictatorships, and history has already belied it. We were told that Soviet Europe was a monolith whose controls would not—could not—ever be relaxed. Where is the monolith now? Where the supposedly indissoluble alliance of Russia and China? The myth, kept alive by the best-oiled propaganda machine of modern times, has misled the peoples of the West, and in Southeast Asia it is bringing East and West alike to the brink of disaster.

The experience of the United States is not to be transferred like a template to other countries. We have had no czars, no war lords, no Batistas or Trujillos. We had a Civil War, but we have managed to ameliorate conditions (although one large section of our people might dispute the point) without nationwide resort to violence. We must recognize, not so much for the sake of our "enemies" as for ourselves, that the Communist regimes are progressing. These regimes are building a better life for their peoples. The cost may be too high in terms of freedom (most Americans would say so), but these peoples never *had* much freedom.

In politics, quackery is the essence of persuasion. When it imperils the country, however, it is time to call it by its right name.

In *The Nation* of April 12, Fred J. Cook reported the substance of the testimony, exhibits and evidence which had been spread on the public record in the course of a most unusual lawsuit pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Testimony taken at a recent closed hearing of Senator McClellan's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, which was first released to the public after our issue had appeared on the newsstands on April 5, presents a quite different version of some of the charges made in that lawsuit.

The record of this hearing includes, among other things, a letter from two officials of the Union Bank of Switzerland stating that the bank at no time had an account in the name of the Pahlavi Foundation of Iran, and that the type face appearing on the bank's purported statements submitted to the subcommittee did not correspond to that used in preparation of bank statements for its customers; affidavits from Mr. and Mrs. Loy Henderson, David Rockefeller, Howard W. Page, Lyle J. Hayden and George V. Allen stating that at no time did they or anyone in their families receive any money from the Pahlavi Foundation, and that they had not seen the checks allegedly bearing their names until shown them by investigators from the subcommittee; and that no direct trace could be found of the transfer of American foreign aid funds into the Pahlavi Foundation.

On September 10, 1963, Senator McClellan, during the course of a hearing on this matter, stated: "We have no interest in this thing other than to get the truth. If aid money that we have been giving over there has been diverted into channels for the benefit of individuals for their use and personal investments, and so forth, we want to know it, and we are going to pursue it."

The Nation's interest is also to get to the truth. We have therefore assigned Mr. Cook to report the contrasting story set forth in the recently released hearing record. —*Editors*

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International Exchange

A Standard Better Than Gold . . . Desmond Smith

In recent years the so-called "gold bloc"— Switzerland, France and Holland — has grown increasingly disenchanted with American monetary policy. Even the buoyant U.S. economy, now in its fiftieth month of expansion, leaves them unimpressed. To their way of thinking, they have been unwilling partners in a poker game which their American partner has been winning consistently by the dubious stratagem of stealing cards from the bottom of the pack. In their view, the United States has been playing fast and loose with easy credit policies at home, while deftly exporting inflation (in the form of excess dollars) abroad. What they now want to do is to call their partner's bluff.

At stake is the American balance of payments. For seven years this has been in deficit, on an average, $3 billion a year. The United States has been meeting its IOUs by paying with dollars — dollars backed by the world's biggest hoard of gold. In principle, the United States stands ready at any time to give a creditor nation gold in return for its dollars. In practice, it is the custom of the U.S. Treasury to settle with dollars. "Dollars as good as gold," as President Johnson recently described them. But the international bankers have been taking another look at the Fort Knox gold hoard; they have not liked what they have seen. By January, 1965, the U.S. gold holdings — once an impressive $24.5 billion—had dwindled to $15.5 billion. Since $13.7 billion covered Federal Reserve deposits and money in circulation, any banker with a pencil stub could reckon that the country's free gold amounted to only $1.8 billion.

At President Johnson's urgent request, Congress in March passed a bill to eliminate the cover requirements for Federal Reserve deposits (leaving that for the currency untouched). This has given the United States an additional $5 billion in "free gold." Yet even $6.8 billion in gold holdings cannot last long if our balance-of-payments deficit continues to run at an annual rate of $3 billion. For if creditor nations were to take gold (as they are entitled to do by U.S. law), instead of dollars, there just might be an old-fashioned run on the Treasury. Confronted with this possibility some conservative economists (and plenty of bankers) are urging a return to high-interest rates. They argue that since the world of international finance is really a series of interlocking reservoirs, capital would once more flow to—instead of from—the United States. But the President has no liking for dear money; to raise borrowing rates would almost certainly bring an end to our record peacetime economic expansion. Another alternative would be to impose legal exchange controls. So far Mr. Johnson has compromised, settling instead for a system of voluntary cooperation to check the outflow of capital. But none of these measures will, in the long run, provide an answer to the challenge that has been raised by the European central bankers.

That challenge has now been dramatized by General de Gaulle. The French President has called for an end to the use of the dollar as an international currency; he wants to restore gold to that position. "Gold," the French leader intoned at his recent press conference; "gold which does not change in nature . . . which has no nationality . . . the immutable and fiduciary value par excellence." Insiders recognize the handwriting on de Gaulle's script. It belongs to Jacques Rueff, economic philosopher, longtime confidant of the French President, and—until de Gaulle's speech —generally dismissed as a fiduciary crackpot who for years has advocated a return to the gold standard and the economic wisdom of 1931.

Nevertheless, Rueff, who holds no official government position, is clearly influencing French monetary policy. Last year the Bank of France—to the dismay of the U.S. Treasury—converted into gold $400 million. This year the French Government has declared that it plans to convert into gold an additional $650 million. Several influential French newspapers have detected in the recent maneuvers of the Bank of France a grand strategy that would, by discrediting the dollar, crush once and for all the hegemony of the Anglo-American financial axis. The immediate effect is bound to be felt in London and Washington, and indeed there is already talk of a "currency war."

Yet on a longer view this may well prove to be a turning point. It must now be obvious in both the White House and Congress that we can no longer support an international monetary system that has tottered along for years; a *mélange* consisting of gold, foreign-exchange balances, general arrangements to borrow, bilateral swaps, and so forth. In a perverse kind of way, General de Gaulle must be thanked for exposing the vulnerability of this patchwork policy. It is gold, contrary to M. Rueff's notions, that has always been the weakest link in this system. To understand why one must take a brief look at the past.

Gold is a remarkably scarce metal; someone has calculated that a modern liner could carry across the Atlantic all the gold that has been dredged or mined in 7,000 years. For this reason, except for brief occasions, gold has been too scarce to serve as a world currency. The First World War swept the last of the gold currency out of public hands and into the vaults of the central banks from which it has never emerged. Thus the first attribute gold got rid of was that of being a "medium of exchange." Commodity Money was replaced by Representative Money. One of the chief reasons was that, despite tremendous gold discoveries in South Africa, the metal supply could not keep pace with the economic expansion. Gold certificates, convertible on demand, took the place of the metal. Since, in practice, these were rarely converted, the central banks gradually reduced the amount of gold cover behind the currency. The 1920s saw a prodigious expansion of the bank system, and bank deposits soon accounted for the bulk of the total

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Desmond Smith is a regular contributor to The Economist *(London).*

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

Goldfinger Aux Ecoutes, Paris

money supply. Yet the use of the "bank rate" to regulate the expansion and deflation of credit in the interests of business stability continued to be related (by banking orthodoxy) to the gold supply. A few economists, chief among them John Maynard Keynes, called for an end to the gold standard. Keynes, in a remarkably prophetic book written in 1923, observed that:

> *For the past two years the United States has* pretended *to maintain a gold standard.* In fact *it has established a dollar standard; and, instead of ensuring that the value of the dollar shall conform to that of gold, it makes provision, at great expense, that the value of gold shall conform to that of the dollar. This is the way by which a rich country is able to combine new wisdom with old prejudice.*

Yet in the 1920s the mystique of gold continued to transfix the orthodox minds that controlled the central banks. Finance ministers were absolutely convinced that a nation's solvency depended, not on its economic resources but upon the correct ratio (each chef had his own proportions) of gold to currency. This farce, which caused widespread depression and suffering, ultimately came to an end with the collapse of a Vienna bank in 1929. In the flight from the currency which followed, Britain and Germany and a number of East European countries went off the gold standard. The year was 1931. Two years later the United States and Canada quit gold. Finally, in 1936, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Holland, the original "gold bloc," threw in the sponge. The utter inflexibility of the gold standard had, among other things, resulted in a drop in world trade from $55.9 billion in 1929 to $24.3 billion in 1937. With the memory of all this clear in their minds, forty-four nations got together at Bretton Woods in 1944 to try to create a new spirit of international monetary cooperation. The British delegate, Lord Keynes, recommended the organization of a "Clearing Union" which would have its own money (he wryly named it "bancor") based on liabilities to member nations. Keynes argued that this was the only possible solution to the problem of "international liquidity."

It must be remembered that in the aftermath of World War II, with Europe and much of Asia shattered, the dollar was at a premium. Then, as now, it was not the gold in Fort Knox that gave the dollar its power — it was America's tremendous industrial resources. Liquidity was a problem because, of course, every nation wanted dollars to rebuild and no one—in 1944—needed marks, francs, zlotys or yen. Harry Dexter White, representing the United States, rejected the Keynes proposals (on the surface they appeared to favor the debtors, not the creditors), and rammed through the "gold exchange standard" which we operate today. Under this standard the dollar has been accepted as a "reserve currency" as good as gold, since the United States stands ready to buy or sell gold at $35 an ounce. White's rejection of Keynes's farsighted idea was a mistake. "The United States would have ended up in a far healthier position," says Professor Robert Triffin of Yale, "if it had financed a larger portion of its early postwar surpluses through an accumulation of bancor claims à la Keynes, rather than through long-term loans and irrecoverable grants à la Marshall."

Twenty years later, the problems of international liquidity are still unresolved. Meanwhile the International Monetary Fund, which emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference, has been forced to act more like a fire brigade than an international bank. Today the continental countries are tired of the role played by Britain and the United States in the IMF. They argue that it is with *their* money that Washington and London act as internationalists. They note that without *their* support both the sterling system and the dollar-gold exchange standard would have broken up long ago. Needless to say, both the Bank of England and the U.S. Treasury object to this analysis. Yet the truth is that the United States has had seven successive years of deficits, while its financial partner, Britain, is now enduring its ninth postwar sterling crisis.

With some scorn, European monetary experts recollect that to deal with the Suez Crisis in 1956, Britain arranged external credits of $1,300 million; in 1961 it was $2,000 million; in 1964 Britain was back for another $4,000 million. Another sore point with the central bankers is the British and American insistence that their position as international bankers requires them to keep the bulk of their own reserves in gold rather than currencies of other countries. So far both the United States and Britain have re-

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sisted any move to replace the pound and the dollar with a new international currency. But as the Common Market grows stronger new voices are heard. They are questioning the ability of the overextended dollar and the weakened pound to support either an expanding world trade or to overcome one more monetary crisis. Moreover, de Gaulle, determined to have a showdown, has chosen to attack at the point where both countries are most vulnerable—their gold reserves.

In this context it is interesting to observe the new *rapprochement* between France and the Soviet Union. In the last seven years Russian gold sales in Western markets have been responsible for more than half the total gold reserve increases of the Western countries. It is not widely realized just how strong a hand the Russians play in the international gold business. The Soviet Union does not, of course, release details either of its gold holdings or its annual production. Both must be sizable. Bullion dealers in the London gold market (the world's principal gold market) estimate that Russian production is at least as high as South Africa's. Although no non-Communist country has yet aligned itself with France's stand, the fact must be faced that a great many of them are sympathetic; those that are not will soon begin to feel political pressures to take another look at their gold holdings.

Japan is particularly susceptible to these pressures because of large dollar holdings in its reserves. The Japanese Government has been under attack from the Socialists who want to build up the ratio of gold to the country's reserves. Thus when the Soviet Union recently offered to sell the Bank of Japan $200 million in gold in return for dollars, there must have been nervous palpitations in Washington. As it happened, Japan refused the Russian largess. While the Soviet Union could have found a legitimate use for the dollars, it is also conceivable that the dollars passing through Russian hands might eventually have been cashed for American gold, if, for example, they had wound up in Paris.

It must be obvious by now that neither gold, dollars nor pounds can continue to play the role of sun, moon and stars in an expanding world economic solar system. Gold may continue to have its devotees, who will argue in favor of its "stability." Yet what stability can there be in a metal, the supply of which is chiefly controlled on the one hand by the Soviet Union, and on the other by the Union of South Africa? Dollars and sterling are unsatisfactory, since their stability continues to rest partly on gold and partly on purely political considerations. Almost half a century ago, Lord Keynes predicted that one day countries would adopt the sensible idea of "managed" currency. Today it has come to pass, and Americans are enjoying unparalleled economic prosperity because of it. Twenty-one years ago Lord Keynes thought the time had come for a "managed" world monetary system. It has yet to happen. Today, voices are calling for a return to gold; the dollar is under attack; sterling is weakening. For old-timers in the IMF who remember Keynes's warning, 1965 looks gloomy.

Monetary experts know that financial nationalism brought on the slumps and endless depressions of the 1930s. Before it is too late there must be a reconsideration—led by the United States and Britain—of Keynes's formula. It is a multilateral solution that seeks the participation of all countries in the management of international liquidity. It may well be argued that Keynes's idea has never been tried in practice. But gold has — and we have the scars to prove it.

The Teen-Age Aristocracy . . . . . Frank Musgrove

Leeds, England

The present century has been remarkable for the expansion of the middle class in the developed countries of the West. Although established, traditional professions like law and medicine have not expanded much faster than the general population, new professions (like social work, accountancy and engineering) have proliferated. The affluent society makes a clean, congenial and healthy life style available to a growing proportion of the adult population; accordingly, it condemns an ever-growing number of children to the rigorous demands, restrictions, expectations and deprivations of a middle-class upbringing. It should be no surprise that there are signs among middle-class adolescents of incipient revolt.

In America, Britain, Australasia and Western Europe the revolt of a portion of middle-class young is apparent to the most casual observer. It is not least apparent in the antechamber to middle-class life, the university and college. The rejection of middle-class standards is most obvious in dress: young men and women are barely distinguishable in their blue denim pants, long hair and sockless shoes. For some, the revolt extends beyond dress to sexual behavior, work habits and political affiliation. It is difficult to estimate the extent of this revolt; it is probably marginal. Only a glittering fragment of the iceberg of middle-class youth is obvious above the surface; the rest probably remain petrified and frozen beneath.

The extension of the middle class means the extension of middle-class child-rearing practices. It would be

Frank Musgrove is a lecturer in Education at Leeds University, England. He is the author of a new book, Youth and the Social Order *(Indiana University Press), to be published in May.*

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foolish to glamorize and sentimentalize working-class childhood; but while working-class children are commonly disciplined by violence, they have traditionally achieved early independence. Middle-class parents are nonviolent in their insistence on cleanliness, regularity, punctuality and application to distant goals; their discipline depends on reasoning, isolation, the exploitation of guilt, love given on specific contract terms (available in return for "good" behavior, withdrawn for "bad"). Working-class discipline may be more desperate; middle-class discipline is more consistent, effective and ruthless. The ruthlessness is most apparent with regard to protracted education and prolonged preparation for approved vocations. Whatever latitude the middle-class parent may be driven to concede in other directions, in the matter of the "right" education he is unflinching.

What Galbraith calls the "new men" earn their superior life style after long training (which becomes ever longer), self-discipline and deprivation. Instinctual drives are subjugated to more distant objectives. Our universities and the later stages of our school system are deprived social environments. The more spirited and adventurous among our young men and women, those who demand wider satisfactions than approval for sustained intellectual exercise, probably account for a high proportion of the college dropouts. Many of those who persist to the end would be capable of nothing else: they graduate out of inertia. It is time that we recognized the value and promise of nongraduation.

The role of the student is narrow and constricted: orderly and even servile behavior, deference to authority (intellectual as well as social), acceptance of the scholastic hierarchy—in short, the virtues of the assiduous bank clerk—are an assurance of success. (Student values are far more homogeneous in the fourth year of college than the first, probably because the less docile have refused to stay the course.) A wider world of social satisfactions and self-respect may be found in vacation work; it is probably sought less to meet economic needs than to preserve essential sanity. Such employment is severely frowned on by the academic hierarchy in England. The student who refuses to learn the semi-monastic role of the ideal student is unlikely to commend himself to his tutors.

Comparatively late marriage, particularly for the males, has become over the past century a condition and symptom of middle-class status. Early marriage has become a social stigma which a middle-class man may spend a lifetime living down. Prostitution and teen-age homosexuality have been tacitly accepted in the past as the necessary price of preparation for a professional career. The more "moral" youngsters destined for the middle-class state have been driven to years of masturbation. In its manifest form, middle-class education into the middle 30s was designed for a race of eunuchs. There are widespread signs that the eunuchs are in revolt.

The life style of the "new men" is earned not only by a decade of theoretical continence throughout the years of maximum sexual potency but by "steady" work habits, acceptance of a regular job with annual incremental advances and an assured pension at the end. The middle-class life style was sustained

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by men and decorated by women; the division of the sex roles was sharp and uncompromising. It is only since World War II that middle-class wives have entered paid employment on an extensive scale.

The revolt against the prerequisites to a middle-class way of life has involved a rejection of theoretical continence by the young, a movement toward earlier marriage, a preference by some for a more episodic way of earning a living, the acceptance of women as economic partners in supporting a household.

And the rebels have rejected the role of symbols assigned to them by their parents' middle-class status. For approximately a century (and no more), the young have been required to display themselves in a manner which demonstrated their own dependence and their parents' affluence. In late Victorian society (as any family photograph of the 1880s shows), the young were extravagantly exhibited in lavish costume which proclaimed the service of a laundry maid. They were paraded in the parks on Sundays (the late-Victorian parks and "promenades" were created as arenas for status display), and they were exhibited in the drawing room when guests arrived. The "sailor suit" and the Little Lord Fauntleroy outfit, the Eton collar and the tailored jacket, were obligatory uniform for the younger male members of the middle-class family. Fine muslins were worn by the daughters.

Since the end of the 19th century, middle-class parents have spent a larger proportion of their income on their children than at any time in the history of Western society. They have paid more for their health, education, accommodation and dress. That is one reason why birth control became a necessity to middle-class couples and its widespread practice dates from this time. Children were no longer required to live on an inferior diet and inhabit the less comfortable and sanitary parts of the house. They came out of the attics into the most sumptuous quarters. They were required to display a robust health. These developments have been attributed to a deeper humanity in middle-class parents. The reason is almost certainly more complex.

In a highly mobile and expanding middle class, ancient proofs of social status were no longer sufficient. A man's thrift, sobriety and probity — even his occupation — might be unknown to his neighbors. More tangible demonstration of status was needed: he could display his wife and children in a manner which left the onlooker in no doubt of his position.

But however magnificent his offspring might be in their childhood, they would be a blot upon his status if they became, in the end, stevedores or schoolteachers. And a more open society reduced the chances that they would automatically inherit his station in life. The open society, with its obvious dangers of social descent, has generated unprecedented activity on the part of middle-class parents. The right educational institutions have become as important as the right adornment (and at least in England, with the rise of school uniform, the two have meant the same). For a century, we have seen the shameless display of children to meet the status requirements of their parents. Tailors and schools have reaped an abundant harvest.

There are heartening signs that the young today are refusing to act as parental advertisements. Their dress is no proclamation of superior background, and males are almost indistinguishable from females. The middle-class youth has rejected his lonely responsibilities: he is in equal partnership with the middle-class girl. And the girl has rejected her decorative purpose.

These trends, which cause so much concern today, are a return to a more "normal" condition after a century of social aberration. The middle-class young who display a fine insouciance, a magnificent disregard for status display and arbitrary differentiation of the sex role, are reverting to a more aristocratic tradition. Middle-class values have enjoyed dominance for a century. More aristocratic responses of courage, disregard for established convention, acceptance of one's sexuality and early marriage are reasserting themselves.

But with regard to protracted formal education (never to the fore in the aristocratic tradition), the middle-class parent has won. This victory is likely to remain secure because it is supported by a vast

complex of economic and social trends. If modern teen-agers refuse to display an appropriate area of immaculate shirt front and cuffs, they are still required to display membership in the appropriate educational institutions. If mother can no longer boast of her children's virginity, she can make much of their doctorates.

A minority will rebel even against doctorates. It is time that we recognized their courage and resourcefulness, for rebellion has been waged against formidable tacticians. Among the rebels may be the true aristocrats on whom an adventurous and inventive society must depend.

Parental pressures are likely to increase rather than diminish. It is probable that they have been increasing steadily in the past couple of decades. Earlier this century, simply to be born into a middle-class family was sufficient assurance that one would become, in time, a middle-class adult. This was partly because competition for high-status jobs was less open; but principally it was because middle-class fertility was low. Middle-class parents were not replacing themselves; their children were a small and diminishing minority. Not only could they easily find middle-class

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employment; there was room at their side for climbers from below.

Over the past twenty years social-class differences in fertility have diminished. Working-class couples have fewer children, middle-class couples have more. Although suitable white-collar employment has expanded, the middle-class child has to fight harder, in these circumstances, to attain it. An indifferent school and college career, marked by gracious living rather than strenuous attainment, the right clothes, accent and connections, may no longer suffice.

Parents show more concern in this situation than many of their children. The alternatives to white-collar, middle-class work are no longer drudgery and penury, and the children often perceive this with greater clarity than their parents. The alternatives may, indeed, be far more attractive than the dedicated application required in many professional careers. The income from "working class" employment may often be superior, the leisure more abundant. What is difficult to understand is not the defection but the continued aspiration to middle-class living, which has lost, or is rapidly losing, its special advantages. In particular, high social status was characterized in the past by abundant leisure. That is precisely why it *was* high status. Today it is characterized by an unremitting toil that invades the innermost privacy of the home. Who, in his senses, would be a surgeon in one of our great hospitals, or a corporation lawyer? There are signs that a growing number of the young are coming to their senses. With greater realism and clarity of vision than their parents, many middle-class young today perceive that the game is not worth the candle.

Failing Banks & Sporty Bankers .. Michael Harris

San Francisco

Perhaps the most startling thing about the current American bank failures is the fact that the star witness and chief target of the Senate's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, now holding hearings on the failures, was himself a star graduate of the American banking system. Don C. Silverthorne, 61-year-old founder of the woe-stricken San Francisco National Bank, worked his way up from messenger to executive of the Bank of America and held high positions in other leading banks on the West Coast. Finally he became vice president in charge of loans for the Transamerica Corporation, which controls banks with 300 offices throughout the West.

Silverthorne's bank was the largest to close in the United States in more than thirty years, but it is only one of a dozen that have failed in the last fifteen months. Hints are also heard of strange happenings in other banks, including the use of forged municipal bonds by one gangster-controlled bank as security for a loan from a larger bank. The current wave of failures is the most severe since the depression years of the 1930s.

There have also been scandals in the savings and loan industry, including arrests and convictions in Maryland, Illinois and California. In Sacramento, California's capital city of about 200,000 population, officers of three of the seven savings and loan associations have been arrested on fraud charges in the last year and a half. The former presidents of two of the associations have already served jail sentences, and an officer of the third is awaiting trial. One of the seven associations has recently been absorbed by a larger, more stable organization. And there are many who predict that the troubles are only beginning.

In addition to his business credentials, Silverthorne displayed the usual respectable trimmings of memberships in the St. Francis Yacht Club, the Stock Exchange Club, the Concordia Club and the Commonwealth Club of California. Last year Mayor John F. Shelley of San Francisco named him as one of the city's three fire commissioners, a position from which he has since resigned.

When Silverthorne faced Chairman John L. McClellan's subcommittee in Washington in late March, his well-financed bank in the prosperous city of San Francisco had failed after only thirty months of life. A succession of witnesses described their dealings with the man who had been regarded by his community as a highly responsible and respectable banker.

Bradford H. McNutt, a real estate developer, said that he and a partner had been required to pay a $100,000 fee before Silverthorne would approve a $550,000 loan from the bank. The "middleman" who charged this stiff fee for signing as "guarantor" of McNutt's loan was William S. Bennett, a remarkable choice for such a role, inasmuch as he himself had defaulted on an astonishing total of 1,506 loans and was being sued for more than $2,500,000. When Bennett's turn came to testify before the committee, he claimed the protection of the Fifth Amendment, but federal banking investigators filled in some of the gaps. They testified that Bennett kept $30,000 of McNutt's fee and passed the $70,000 balance along to Silverthorne.



Then there was Ron Zimmerman, a youthful San Francisco collector of apartment houses, who said that when he needed a $50,000 loan to close a particularly profitable deal he was required to cut in a director of the bank. Zimmerman also told the committee that Silverthorne operated a sideline of a sort unusual in banking circles—he sold jewelry, which he obtained from a fellow bank director who was part owner of a San Francisco pawn shop and which he kept in a plush-lined tray in his desk.

"He said, 'Boy, does your wife have a nice bracelet?'" Zimmerman told the committee. "He threw me

Michael Harris is a reporter on the San Francisco Chronicle.

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

the bracelet, and I thought it was a gift and said, 'Thanks.' Then Mr. Silverthorne said, 'Now, write me a check for $6,040.' I said I didn't want to buy the bracelet and he said, 'Do you want a loan or don't you?' " Zimmerman testified that he managed to pawn the bracelet a few days later, but Silverthorne made him reclaim it.

At least Zimmerman got the jewelry. Morley (Judge) Turner, another real estate investor, testified that he too saw the plush-lined tray. "I came in one day," Turner told the committee, "and Mr. Silverthorne said, 'You've just bought me a watch.' A counter check for $2,400 was waiting for my signature." Turner testified that Silverthorne forced him to rent a 6-by-12-foot office in the Don Silverthorne Building for $500 a month. And further, Turner said, Silverthorne regularly made unauthorized withdrawals of $10,000 to $20,000 a month from Turner's account in the bank.

The committee was incredulous.

"Mr. Silverthorne had complete control of my accounts and the stock in my corporation," Turner said in reply to questioning. "I knew what was happening to me, but I didn't know what to do but try to get out and later take the steps necessary to rescue my funds. It was a daily nightmare."

The committee was also told that James D. Claitor, president of the San Jose (Calif.) Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing Service, had to pay Bennett a $40,000 fee before Silverthorne would approve a $200,000 loan from San Francisco National Bank. Claitor was not called to testify, but told a reporter that the demand for the big commission came so late in a deal that there was no time for him to turn to other lending sources.

But it wasn't just the borrowers—a group whose members sometimes referred to themselves as "the janitors in Silverthorne's bank"—who were exposed to odd financing practices. Two San Francisco savings and loan associations participated in a deal that involved the Don Silverthorne Building, a two-story structure adjacent to the bank's headquarters in the city's financial district. Silverthorne bought the handsome little building for $300,000 and, on the strength of a $3,000-a-month lease from his own bank, was able to get a $350,000 mortgage, issued jointly by Argonaut Savings and Loan Association and City Savings and Loan Association. Later, Argonaut Savings lent Silverthorne another $250,000 on the same building, boosting his loan to a total of $600,000. Payments on the loan were defaulted even before the bank was shut down, and the two associations face the possibility of heavy losses. Government appraisers have stated that the building is worth only the $300,000 Silverthorne paid for it.

Argonaut Savings also had the misfortune to see $1.3 million of its funds frozen as deposits in San Francisco National Bank on January 22, the day when Comptroller of the Currency James J. Saxon shut down the bank as hopelessly insolvent. Another twist to the bizarre story emerged when the Senators were told that Lester E. Weaver, City Savings' president, also served as an agent for the New York Life Insurance Company and sold term life insurance to some borrowers of San Francisco National Bank at about twice the prevailing rate. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's report to the committee said Silverthorne received $6,250 as a "kickback on life insurance premiums . . . from Lester Weaver."

There were other probable big losers in Silverthorne's debacle. The United Auto Workers Union had a $3 million certificate of deposit in the bank—a one-year deposit that could not be withdrawn until the note matured this April. The union entrusted this large part of its $53 million defense fund to a young, middle-sized bank in California because Silverthorne agreed to pay what the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation called an illegal "bonus" of an extra half of 1 per cent for the money—a sum that amounted to only $15,000. A Detroit money broker got a legal commission of $7,500 from the bank for placing the union funds.

Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association, considered by many to be among the nation's most conservative, had $1.5 million on deposit with San Francisco National. A tiny Negro savings and loan association in Oakland, which had turned to Silverthorne for financial advice last summer, deposited $200,000 in the bank in gratitude for his help. He refused late last year to let the Oakland group withdraw its funds. In all, the bank held more than $20 million in funds placed through certificates of deposit—an astonishing total for a bank with

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total assets barely in excess of $50 million.

Silverthorne's gaudy bubble was burst by Lytton Savings and Loan Association of Los Angeles, the industry maverick headed by Bart Lytton, a politically powerful contributor to the Democratic Party in California. Like others in California's financial circles, Lytton knew that San Francisco National was in trouble, and when his association's $1.5 million certificate came due on January 22, he demanded immediate payment — and not by check. That was the end: San Francisco National was left without enough money to function.

Lytton still had $200,000 in certificates of deposit in San Francisco National Bank after the closing, but that was a relatively modest loss. It was certainly better than Lytton's experience in two other bank failures. His association had $500,000 in the First National Bank of Marlin, Tex., when that bank was closed down last year, and an estimated $300,000 in the Brighton (Colorado) National Bank when it was declared insolvent on the same day that San Francisco National failed.

The recent difficulties in money circles may be an offshoot of the change in the public's attitude about bankers—and the bankers' attitudes about themselves. The stolid banker with the mutton-chop whiskers and elk's-tooth watch chain is gone. His successor could be found a few years ago in a branch bank in a suburb about 50 miles from San Francisco, where the manager was working in a loud sport shirt and the young girls behind the tellers' windows were wearing leis. Hawaiian music blared through the bank from 10 A.M. opening to 3 P.M. closing. The manager explained that the bank was "going Hawaiian" for two weeks to encourage its customers to borrow for vacations in the islands.

The savings and loan industry faces a profits squeeze. For competitive reasons, almost every association in California is paying 4.85 per cent interest on deposits, and since interest is compounded at least quarterly, and in many cases daily, the actual cost of money to the industry is close to 5 per cent. This leaves an association with two alternatives. The conservative course is to compete for the business of sound borrowers, who can

get bank mortgages for 6 per cent. The profit margin will be slim, but the association can be reasonably sure there will be very few foreclosures.

The second course is to make riskier loans at higher rates and to require the borrowers to pay heavy discounts in advance. A tract builder who signs a note for $2 million may be charged five "points" for the privilege of getting the loan; in other words, 5 per cent or $100,000 will be deducted in advance. Then he pays higher interest rates, perhaps 7 per cent. The risk is, of course, much higher, but the associations that accept such business rely on higher profits to offset an occasional loss. This policy of risky loans worked surprisingly well while real estate prices were rising on a steady curve in California. But defense cutbacks in Sacramento suddenly knocked away the base of that community's housing market.

In the case of one Sacramento association, more than one outstanding loan in five turned sour.

Silverthorne applied the same theory to banking. San Francisco National Bank could pay bonuses to get money because the bank seemed able to get extraordinary returns on its loans. Or as Zimmerman testified before the McClellan Committee, "Silverthorne told me, 'You're making a lot of money out of using our money at the bank. You shouldn't complain if we make a little money, too.' That seemed fair to me."

For a while, the practice seemed to work. No one realized how many borrowers were falling behind the stiff repayment schedule Silverthorne had set for them. The bank's stock was issued at $30 a share, and in the period of early optimism its price rose rapidly. There was abundant testimony that when the stock got to about $60 a share Silverthorne began requiring some borrowers at the bank to buy stock from him personally for about $90 a share. He didn't mind if the borrowers didn't have the money; a loan could be arranged at San Francisco National Bank—even though banks are forbidden by law to lend money on their own stock.

Silverthorne made about $400,000 on such stock deals, federal agents testified, and about $800,000 in personal "commissions" collected from borrowers. He put $2.2 million through his personal checking accounts in twenty-one months, according to the testimony of A. E. Larsen, San Francisco regional comptroller of the currency.

Even for a man with a salary of $60,000 a year, Silverthorne was a big spender. Larsen said that he spent $127,871 on luxuries in a single year. The items included: jewelry, $49,987; a Rolls-Royce, $16,200; car for a friend, $4,700; a funeral plot, $27,000; home for daughter, $20,000, and paintings, $9,984.

But even more money vanished in Las Vegas, where investigators found that the sporty banker drew $906,246 from eight casinos by presenting a mixture of good checks, bad checks and IOUs. Silverthorne's unpaid gambling debts still amount to $227,250, the Senators were told.

"Have you no evidence he might not have drawn out the money for other purposes than gambling—

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perhaps to keep the money?" Senator Carl T. Curtis, Nebraska Republican, asked.

"I was informed," Donald O'Connell, a staff counsel of the committee, replied drily, "that Mr. Silverthorne bet on 11 and 12 to come on the next roll of the craps table." Few, if any, of the world's great fortunes have been built by men who habitually bet on such difficult rolls. The bets show a certain romantic approach toward gambling —like going for an inside straight in poker.

Comptroller of the Currency Saxon tried for months to keep San Francisco National alive; among other things, persuading Silverthorne's fellow directors to oust their president last fall, about three months before the money finally ran out. Highly critical comments by a bank examiner were omitted from the copies of a report that were forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Saxon intercepted and filed away an examiner's recommendation to United States Attorney Cecil Poole of San Francisco in June, 1964, that the FBI look into San Francisco National's operations.

These good offices have left Saxon in an apparently untenable position. In Washington, it is believed his time in office is about over. Some big depositors have sued the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, receiver of the bank, on the grounds that if Saxon had stepped in earlier, when he first learned about the trouble, the total shortage would have been smaller. There is no way of telling yet how many cents on the dollar the big depositors can hope to recover; the amount will depend on the quality of the loans Silverthorne granted. The most frightening statistic is that before the bank was closed down, 42 per cent of its outstanding loans were delinquent.

Closing a bank is a drastic act, and it should come as no surprise that Saxon hesitated. State banking officials have held back in other cases, hoping to nurse sick banks back to health, and they have sometimes succeeded. Savings and loan commissioners have also managed to rescue a number of foundering institutions under their command in recent months.

Anybody who wanted it might have found guidance from Silverthorne himself, who offered a lengthy set of maxims to Don C. Silverthorne, Jr., on the youth's twenty-first birthday. "Always be truthful and honest with yourself and others," Silverthorne wrote. "There is no substitute for integrity."

Reductio ad Vietnam . . . . . Russell J. Leng

The trouble with the Vietnam situation is that no one has yet had the courage to state the real case for the full-fledged "hard-nose" approach. To be sure, a great many people, from Senator Dodd to the President, have hinted as to what *may* happen if the war in Vietnam goes on much longer and spreads even further. But no one has thus far had the courage to argue the case of the American commitment on grounds of plain pragmatism and historical precedent.

First of all, there is the matter of world opinion. It counted for a great deal under such "image"-conscious men as the late President Kennedy, but more realistic politicians ever since have rammed home the theme that what *really* matters is domestic consensus. Foreigners don't vote. Recently, Dean Acheson has been expounding this neo-Machiavellian logic on campuses, at the White House, and in *The New York Times Magazine*. The argument for ignoring world public opinion is certainly impressive: the Russians were hardly hurt by it when they crushed the 1956 Budapest uprising (in any case, they were hurt a great deal less than if the Hungarians had succeeded); and in the deeper past, Mussolini, for example, got Ethiopia—moral condemnation and an economic embargo notwithstanding—by using some *real* poison gas, not just Secretary McNamara's "riot-control agents." Nobody seems to mind when one of the world's oldest civilized nations, Egypt, uses some of that stuff on the Yemeni tribesmen (or is it again *real* poison gas? and if so, who gave it to Egypt?).

Second, the case for limiting the horrors of war is old stuff. One is reminded here of the German delegate to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference who argued against such limitations on the ground that making war more humane would incite more people to resort to it. What counts in Vietnam is "the win" (a new "hard-nose" word for the old-fashioned "victory"), and if



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that requires gases, it is just too bad. In any case, what we are using is not lethal to *healthy* adults. The same dose, of course, may kill a child or a sick person—and in Vietnam, more than 50 per cent of the population is under 14.

But, as the State Department keeps pointing out, we did not even ratify that embarrassing 1925 Geneva Convention on gas and bacteriological warfare — we, along with the then already militarist Japanese. What the Department does not point out is that the U.S.-German Peace Treaty of August 25, 1921 (our substitute peace treaty for the Versailles Agreements) accepts Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty which refers to the prohibition of "asphyxiating, poisonous *or other gases* and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices."

Such gases should permit the easy sorting out of the "good" Vietnamese from the "bad" Vietnamese, if only we could convince the Vietcong to wear distinctive uniforms at all times, along with properly issued ID cards. And if *that* doesn't work, we can use such gases in North Vietnam and capture the Ho Chi Minh government while it is vomiting. The fact that such a mission (as is the case of some of the present-day bombing missions) may start from Thailand, which is not at war with North Vietnam and thus violates Article 2 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare by allowing the use of its bases, is a minor point. Neutralism (and even neutrality) is bad, wherever it is found.

That leaves two problems to be faced up to in Vietnam, one big and one small. The small problem is the torture administered in the field of counterinsurgency by the South Vietnamese (but, according to reliable reports, in the presence of, if not with the cooperation of, American soldiers and officers). Torture and the degrading treatment of military and civilian prisoners is again strictly forbidden by Article 3 of the 1949 Convention on War Victims, which the United States duly signed, and which the South Vietnamese adhered to by virtue of France's signature as representing the then existing French Union. It surely is a sign of the growing sophistication of American public opinion (or of its acceptance of brutality and violence) that no one *really* makes a great fuss over the drastic pictures of torture that are being regularly displayed in the press. Under similar circumstances in Algeria, for example, public outcry forced the French Government to take strong measures against the use of torture.

The big problem that still hovers is the glaring light of a UN debate on Vietnam. In the case of Suez, or Budapest, or Nigeria, or even the American landings on Lebanon, that debate proved sufficiently awkward to one or several of the powers concerned to make them either back down or at least soften their stand. That, thank God, does not appear to be in store for the United States. Everybody cooperates with us in keeping the Vietnam pot from boiling over in public! Charles de Gaulle's France, a permanent Security Council member, could easily twist the American eagle's tail, and pay back our lecturing and hectoring of the Suez and Algerian days, by bringing up Vietnam as a "threat to world peace" (which indeed it is, or may well become overnight). But France does its grumbling off-stage. The Soviet Union could conceivably gain an important propaganda advantage by bringing up the problem and compelling the United States to veto the debate (thus evening the score of Budapest). But the Soviet Union, apparently only too happy to see the Chinese Reds backed into a corner, remains mute. And it is certainly too much to expect that such staunch dependents of the United States as Bolivia, Jordan, Malaysia or Holland (all on the Security Council this year) are going to rock the boat. Small wonder that UN Secretary-General U Thant was brutally squelched when he timidly attempted to enter the Vietnam debate. The "hard noses" have it all their way, and apparently not only in Washington.

How well this new American stance has succeeded internationally is not yet clearly appreciated here; but it soon will be, as the reality of the new "to-hell-with-world-opinion" trend really begins to sink in. At a NATO military

Macpherson, Toronto Star

Russell J. Leng teaches in the Department of Government, Howard University.

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planning conference in Washington earlier this month, one of the senior French representatives expressed his views on the new Washington policy line in the following terms:

Actually, de Gaulle made a bad mistake in Algeria. In spite of his apparent disdain for world opinion, he bowed to it by abandoning a war which he was militarily in the process of winning. If he only had held out another year or so, he could have invaded Tunisia and wiped out the Algerian FLN guerrillas there; or bombed half of Morocco to smithereens. And some of that "riot control agent" would have turned much of the Maghreb [North Africa] *into a docile province.*

Just think what an encouragement American actions in Vietnam must be for Salazar's hard-pressed Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, for the white supremacists in Rhodesia and South Africa! As in de Gaulle's case, their only real problem is not the ineffective African forces facing them, but getting the United States off their back. If Vietnam just goes on for a while, they're probably safe for another twenty years.

Of course he was joking; or was he?

Good Samaritans

Law and the Golden Rule . . . . . Lois Wille

Chicago

One spring day about four years ago a Chicago Negro cab driver named Lawrence H. Boyd saw two youths being attacked by three others on a dreary South Side street. He jumped out, ran over, and helped the boys beat off the robbers. Boyd was shot twice in the chest and once in the hand, and entered a hospital as a hero: hailed by police, his boss, the press. The Illinois Medical Society even announced it would "take care" of all his medical bills.

Boyd, now 43, was rediscovered last week by a Chicago *Daily News* reporter who found him living in a modest flat in one of the city's all-Negro ghettos — penniless, broken and bitter. He summed up what had happened to him in the four years since he tried to be a good Samaritan: "I've had nothing but heartaches."

His $1,269 hospital bill is still unpaid; so is his $1,000 doctor's bill. The Illinois Medical Society apparently forgot. His boss, Checker Cab Co., was more blunt. "They told me they paid me for driving a cab, not for stopping robbers," Boyd said. "They told me I should have minded my own business."

And, when Boyd failed to recover the use of his right arm, the company dropped him. For four years he and his wife have had to live on the $65 a week she earns as a clerk in a dress shop. "When I was working as a cab driver I made $150 a week," he said. "Now I can't even pay the $2 gas bill. When my son comes home from the Air Force on furlough, I don't even have a dime to buy him a cup of coffee. That hurts."

Would he do it again? Yes, he says. "If you see a man in trouble and he needs help, you have to help him—don't you?"

On the same day, April 9, that the newspaper told his story, scholars from three continents were wrestling with Boyd's question at the University of Chicago. Authorities in sociology, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy and journalism joined law professors at a Good Samaritan Conference sponsored by the Sentry Insurance Companies of Stevens Point, Wis. It was inspired by the string of "bad" Samaritan stories that began last year in Kew Gardens, N.Y., where 28-year-old Catherine Genovese was fatally stabbed while thirty-eight people ignored her cries for help. [See "The Murder They Heard" by Stanley Milgram and Paul Hollander, *The Nation*, June 15, 1964.]

The daylong meeting was barely an hour old when it became obvious that there were two distinct issues:

Anglo-American laws tend to discourage people from helping others in peril by making no provisions to compensate them for injuries or damages they may suffer, and by leaving them vulnerable to lawsuits. Should the laws be shifted to protect good Samaritans? Should it compensate them for loss of money or property or good health; or guard them against lawsuits when they have acted in good faith?

Is helping your fellow man an obligation, rather than just an ideal for which to strive? And if it is, should the law recognize this obligation and penalize the person who ignores someone in trouble?

To the questions raised by the first issue, almost everyone at the conference said "yes," Americans as well as Europeans. Norval Morris, an Australian who is currently a law professor at the University of Chicago, expressed what seemed to be the consensus of the day:

If the criminal can compensate, it is wise in some cases to provide that he should. But this is a rare situation and a society which values good Samaritanship cannot rely on this alone. State compensation schemes are, in my view, essential if we are sincere in this matter of good Samaritanship.

Crime, Morris went on, seems unfortunately to be endemic. And since it is chance in most instances which defines who shall be the victim of crime, and a combination of chance and high moral qualities which defines who shall be the injured good Samaritan, then "it is surely proper that the society which is so organized that crime is endemic should share in the financial aspects of the loss to the good Samaritan. . . . We compensate soldiers and their dependents who suffer for us from the external aggression of war. We should likewise share the loss to good Samaritans who suffer for us from the internal aggression of crimes of personal violence."

It was the second question —should the law penalize "bad" Samaritans — that raised the tough moral, philosophic and legal issues. And here the difference in Ameri-

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Lois Wille is a Pulitzer Prize-winning Chicago Daily News *reporter who specializes in welfare issues, mental health, civil liberties.*

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can and European attitudes was vivid.

"I don't see how we can legislate charity, altruism and courage — both physical and moral," said Charles O. Gregory, University of Virginia law professor. When you talk about punishing people who fail to act you get into serious trouble, he said, and began the theme that other American participants picked up during the day:

If we do that, we embark on a line-drawing task that is delicate indeed. Who is to judge that circumstances threaten danger to the rescuer—or when an undertaking is onerous to another? The problem of the good Samaritan is really much broader than just helping people in physical danger and distress. The whole problem of remaining silent is now an acute one everywhere. . . . Many people believe Mr. Eisenhower should have destroyed [Senator] McCarthy when he was trying to destroy General Marshall. . . . At parties, should we let someone give vent to racial and religious prejudice and bigotry without calling him on it? How about hospital staffs and doctors who fail to comply with the law in reporting babies and young children seriously hurt by beatings — obviously inflicted by their parents?

Suppose you are next in line at the ticket window and see the agent give the customer back $10 too much in change. All you have to do is speak. But in doing so you make a fool of the agent and a knave of the customer.

To what extent is one his brother's keeper? Should you tell someone his house may be on fire when you're not sure? Or that his car is illegally parked? Or his fly is open?

Just where do you draw the line?

Anthony Honore, fellow of New College at Oxford University, had a succinct reply: "Yes, the line will be difficult to draw. But lawyers are professional line drawers. And the relevant factors are easy enough to list: the gravity of the peril, the chance of successful intervention, the attitude of the victim and the likelihood that another better qualified rescuer will act."

There is even a definable line between altruism and meddling, according to Honore. "Of course we don't want our next-door neighbor rushing in to rescue the baby every time he screams, or interrupting our family quarrels. But this merely shows that the received morality draws the line at officiousness. The test of what is officious will usually be whether the intending rescuer would reasonably suppose that his help will be welcome. If the victim objects or would be expected to object, the rescuer should abstain — unless the victim is too young or too deranged to know his own interests."

But Gregory and other Americans wondered if, in the final analysis, our traditional attitude of minding one's own business isn't too stubborn, too imbedded, to be changed by law.

They noted that our laws are impregnated with "mind your own business." Immigrants came to these shores to escape the ancient walls of their home towns and the tyranny of their landlords, full of the dream of unrestrained individual freedom. Our farmers shunned the European way of farm houses in a cluster; instead, they built solitary houses out in their own fields. The American obsession with privacy that anthropologist Margaret Mead writes about is, if anything, stronger today with the mass anonymity of our large cities, an anonymity that dulls the senses and stifles our neighborliness. And the conclusion was: laws can't change all this.

Ironically, it was two foreigners — an Englishman and a Frenchman—who pointed out that the civil rights legislation in the United States of the past ten years has demonstrated the extraordinary sway of the law as a shaper of opinion, "an awakener to the requirements of justice and ethics," as one of them put it. They cited changes in Gallup and other polls in the past decade which indicate that as an aftermath of anti-segregation laws a larger and larger segment has viewed segregation as morally wrong.

Both André Tunc, professor of law at the University of Paris, and Anthony Honore favor legal punishment for people who refuse to help someone in peril — with the important qualification that the rescuer is not required to endanger his own life.

Tunc's country has had such a law for twenty-four years and he said it works well. Honore's country has no such law, but he deplored what he called the Anglo-American "irrational conviction that because law and morals do not always coincide, there is some virtue in their being different," and said flatly: "The objections to the introduction of a legal duty to rescue hardly withstand scrutiny."

Their contentions that such a law can mold attitudes were at least partially backed up by some statistics presented to the conference by Hanz Zeisel, professor of both law and sociology at the University of Chicago. At present, France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union have statutes which call for imprisonment and fines if someone fails to help avert injury or death to another person—provided he can do so without danger to himself. England, Austria and the United States have no such law.

Zeisel presented students in Germany, Austria and the United States with four case histories, each one constituting a crime against which the German statute is directed:

A young man, when asked to help, failed to bring water to a burning town.

An auto driver saw a small child on an expressway but drove on instead of stopping and guiding the child off the road.

A housewife refused entry to her house to a man who had just been attacked on the street.

An elderly lady had fallen unconscious on the sidewalk, and a man walking by acted as though he had not seen her.

The box at the bottom of this page tabulates the student reaction to the question: What should the law do about people who behave this way?

Zeisel thinks it extremely significant that a total of 75 per cent of American students believes assistance should remain only a matter of conscience, compared to 42 per cent in Germany.

Incidentally, Zeisel found in the same survey that people in all three countries said they would be least likely to help the child on the highway; only 34 per cent of all

	Germany	*Austria*	*U.S.*
1. Nothing	42%	62%	75%
2. Make them pay damages	16	5	8
3. Fine them	20	18	15
4. Jail them	22	15	2

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the young people said they would stop — perhaps a realistic assessment of the hazards of modern superhighways. The elderly lady and the burning town would be most likely to get aid—69 per cent of all those questioned. A total of 59 per cent said they would help the wounded man.

All four of these cases would also be subject to fines or jail in France, under its "crime of abstention" statutes first written into the law during German occupation in 1941 and reaffirmed after liberation in 1945.

In a typical year, 1962, Tunc reported that 52 people were sent to jail and 12 were fined for "crimes of abstention." Not a great number, but "perhaps higher than we should like it to be," the French law professor said.

What kind of people were sentenced? What caused them to act as they did? The general picture is varied: An excellent swimmer, talking to friends by a river, refuses to dive in to rescue someone thrashing about and crying for help in the water. A hunter shoots somebody by mistake, but—having discovered his blunder—does nothing for the victim. A physician is jailed for refusing to make a late-night visit to the victim of a traffic accident, even though he maintained that he had been told an ambulance had already been called.

And apparently the physicians' lobby is as powerful in France as it is here. Tunc added: "The physicians of that region made very strong protests and their colleague was released a few days later."

Has this law encouraged people to be better neighbors — good Samaritans? Tunc was careful in his answer. Detecting the impact of law on social behavior is difficult and in this case hasn't really been attempted, he said. But he cited statutes that provide compensation for damages incurred in a rescue attempt and another that protects the rescuer from lawsuits and concluded: "At least it can safely be stated that French law is in no way a deterrent to good Samaritan behavior. On the contrary, it acts as an incentive to everybody to behave like a good Samaritan. And that is good."

Then, as a Parisian scholar should, Tunc brought in a smattering of Sartre: How, he asks, can you distinguish between the man who does something and the man who allows something to be done when he can interfere? Don't both involve his freedom of choice, his creative power, his engagement in the world?



Rembrandt

The Good Samaritan

"A stone does not bear liability if a murder is committed beside it," Tunc said. "A man does. By this decision not to interfere, he participates in the murder."

Honore, using another kind of philosophic argument, agrees with Tunc's conclusions. There are times when giving aid to a man in peril is an ideal, he says, and there are times when it is a duty. The law should distinguish between them, and impose penalties on the man who shirks his duty. He added:

"Isn't the refusal to enforce the moral obligation to help others itself a moral offense, of which lawyers and legislators have been guilty in the English-speaking world this hundred years?

"The law cannot be neutral. If the law does not encourage rescue, it is sure to discourage it. If it does not compensate, it will indirectly penalize. If the rescuer who suffers injury or incurs expense or expends his skill goes without compensation, the law, so far as it influences conduct at all, is discouraging rescue."

To the Anglo-American legal argument that there is something peculiarly irksome in requiring people to take positive action as opposed to subjecting them to mere prohibitions, Honore replied:

"Isn't it more arduous to control the violent impulses of our nature than to overcome the temptation to leave others in the lurch?"

Honore agreed with the frequently expressed American viewpoint that the chief agent for enforcing morality is public opinion. But then he took the further step that—at this conference, at least—only the English and the French participants ventured to take:

"The law, when it imposes a duty to do what shared morality already requires, is not enforcing but reflecting, reinforcing and specifying morality. And there are strong reasons, I think, why the law should reflect, reinforce and specify at least that segment of the shared morality which consists in moral duties owed to others. . . .

"The law cannot make men good, but it can encourage and help them to do good."

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The Carpetbagger's New Clothes

THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877. By Kenneth M. Stampp. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 229 pp. $4.95.

Bernard A. Weisberger

To the believer in racial equality, reading the headlines from Alabama, the Reconstruction story reads like wish-fulfilling fantasy. Starting in 1867, the white supremacist leadership of the South was barred from the polls while Negroes were not only allowed but encouraged to vote. Southern state legislatures willingly ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, while Congress stood always on the ready to enforce them with all necessary power.

But as one reads the record further, the dream dissolves into harsh documentary. The mortal frailties of all governments tainted the record of the "Radical" (i.e., Southern Republican) legislatures with corruption and error. Bit by bit, "Conservative" (i.e., anti-Reconstruction) whites found their way back to the franchise. Taking advantage of internal Radical feuds, and utilizing violence and illegality where they had to, they drove their Negro and white Republican enemies from the field. Within ten years after the tough phase of Reconstruction had begun, it was over; Southern political life was once more firmly white. And the nation acquiesced.

There are lessons to be learned here, and Professor Stampp's new book beautifully points them up. It is well to note at the start, however, that until quite recently, this story of Reconstruction, which told of its undermining and collapse, was generally celebrated in American historical letters as a triumphant redemption of national honor. How this version came into being and why historians like Stampp today reject it, present in themselves highly interesting questions.

The orthodox histories of the South written between the turn of the century and World War II by such men as James Ford Rhodes, John W. Burgess, William A. Dunning, George Fort Milton and Claude Bowers were derived essentially from a conception of American life highly sensitive to the "abnormal" qualities of Reconstruction. In the view of these authors, Lincoln and Andrew Johnson both offered lenient plans for reunion which would have quickly restored the functioning of the pre-1861 political organism to its natural middle-class leadership. Indeed, the nation would rest on a firmer foundation than ever with the two great divisive issues, slavery and secession, settled at last.

But (this traditional view holds) such an outcome was not nearly thorough enough for the Radical Republicans in Congress. They insisted on a complete purgation of Southern life. Their motivation was compounded of: (1) misguided idealism, which vastly overrated the potentialities of the Negro; (2) zeal to pin down the ascendancy of the Republican Party indefinitely; (3) a wish to protect, against a resurgence of Southern agrarian votes, the structure of wartime banking, tariff, and railroad-subsidy legislation which enhanced the prospects of industrial capitalism. (This last view of Radical aims was stressed particularly by economic determinists, chiefly Charles A. Beard.) And (4) sheer revolutionary spleen. "Vindictives" and "Jacobins" were names commonly applied by histories of this type to Reconstruction's architects.

Thrusting aside Johnson's leadership, the Radical-controlled Congress insisted on a rebuilding of Southern state governments by conventions chosen in elections which legally excluded all prewar officeholders who had later supported the Confederacy —in effect, the entire Southern elite. The appalling consequences, according to the orthodox histories, were predictable. Dixie fell into the hands of three groups—the "ignorant blacks," the "carpetbaggers" (Northern spoilsmen gathered in ragged hordes to pick the carcass) and the "scalawags" (Southerners ready to abandon principle for profit). What ensued Lord Bryce called "a Saturnalia of robbery and jobbery," as the best lacked all power and the worst were full of passionate hungers. Eventually, however, the inevitable reaction set in, and the

Bernard A. Weisberger teaches at the University of Rochester.

Ocean! —

I don't like how I long
just for something beautiful
and wept when I saw golden sparkles
on the Mississippi — somewhere
inside I must be dying
so frantically to lust for life.
Indeed, these days my contempt
for the misrulers of my country
is icy and my voice
of indignation almost raucous.
Once American faces
were beautiful to me, I was
their lover, but they now look cruel
and as if they had narrow thoughts.
Their photographs in the advertisements
spread devastation in my soul
as their gasoline denudes
the woods of Indo-China.
But a poet needs to praise.
I shall go into exile; it is wrong
to live where I do not care for the people.
What is the use of flailing about
like a wounded animal?
nothing can come of spite and disdain.
Pilot! please fly on,
do not descend upon my native city.

Ocean! —

Paul Goodman

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healing forces of national good sense went to work. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, "Negro rule under unscrupulous adventurers [was] finally put an end to in the South, and the *natural, inevitable* ascendancy of the whites, the *responsible* class, established." (Emphasis added.)

The central themes in this theory are the respect for the "inevitable" restoration of national unity and the exaltation of responsibility, trained leadership and especially fiscal responsibility. Those scholars who studied Reconstruction as it occurred in individual states devoted whole pages to tax and debt tables, and culled some of their juiciest indictments from such ordinarily dry sources as state auditors' reports.

It is not at all hard to understand these attitudes in terms of the Progressive crusade of 1900 to 1917 which influenced many academicians, and which denounced spoilsmanship and waste of every kind in terms of unbated wrath; simultaneously, it also invoked a strong sense of national reforming purpose which was to be fulfilled under the leadership of a disinterested elite. John W. Burgess, of the Columbia faculty of Political Science, caught the spirit of things when he declared that Reconstruction furnished, "in place of government by the most intelligent and virtuous part of the people for the benefit of the governed . . . government by the most ignorant and vicious part of the population for the benefit, the vulgar, materialistic, brutal benefit of the governing set."

A strain of thinking less admirable than that of the Progressive devotion to efficiency was also evident in the writings of the Burgess-Dunning school of historians. They shared a popular assumption that no people had shown gifts for responsible self-government comparable to those of the Anglo-Saxons. In the first decade of the 20th century, the nation took up the white man's burden in Asia and Latin America, consented to the *de facto* nullification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and moved toward an immigration-restriction policy designed to shut out what one public official called "the beaten races." It is not surprising that then current scholarship willingly embraced the contention that the Negro, far "behind" the whites in evolution, could not possibly have been assimilated into a modern social order as a partner. In the negative view of Reconstruction, society got (as always) exactly the kind of self-justifying history it wanted.

In Stampp's book one finds the fruits of a reworking of this story at almost every point, undertaken in the past fifteen years or so by a new group of historians whom one may call Reconstruction's revisionists. (It is not the best possible name, since among professionals in United States history "revisionism" often refers to an interpretation of the *coming* of the Civil War which is, if anything, pro-Southern, but it has taken hold and will have to serve.) These scholars come from both races and every section, and are part of that traveling freemasonry of foundation fellows and visiting lecturers which has cosmopolitanized academic life.

The salient points in the new version, as laid down by such writers as C. Vann Woodward, John Hope Franklin, Eric McKitrick, David Donald, Harold Hyman, W. R. Brock, John and LaWanda Cox, Richard Current, and of course Stampp himself, among numerous others, are these. To begin with, Andrew Johnson was less a magnanimous nationalist than an old-fashioned, rural Tennessee stump politician, distrustful both of rich men *and* Negroes, and devoted to States' rights up to the edge of secession, but not beyond. Brave enough, he was incapable of gauging the national desire for at least token citizenship for the ex-slaves and for assurances that the South was ready to rejoin the Union in spirit as well as form. He offered no leadership, no alternative to Radicalism except restoration of the South to its Confederate masters.

The Radicals were by no means a monolithic group. Their "vindictiveness" does not seem borne out by a record which shows no mass arrests, trials or executions, but rather only a disfranchisement policy which lasted no more than ten years in all and was constantly whittled down in scope before its abandonment. Radicals did not present a united front on economic matters. When it came to such specific issues as inflation, the tariff, immigration, public-land disposition and transportation subsidies they divided, like any politicians, on class, regional and party lines. Moreover, there is no acceptable yardstick which can measure the genuine stretch of their professed idealism on behalf of the Negro—no way of confidently asserting of *all* of them that when they demanded "equality of suffrage" they whispered "for Republican voters only" behind their hands.

The "carpetbaggers" went South for a variety of reasons, grounded in the economic opportunism which, in the business world or in the West, was regarded as a wholesome device for building up the country. The "scalawags" included many honest Southerners who had long opposed the Confederate rulers of their states, or who were attracted by the Republican program of encouragement to economic growth, which potentially promised a good deal to their underdeveloped section.

As to that dreadful aberration, "Negro rule," it is clear that many black officeholders were not the unlettered brutes of the "tragic legend" (as Stampp calls the long-accepted Reconstruction story) but educated and competent men who were free before the war. The Negro laborer did indeed have his troubles in adjusting to independence, but this was due in part to a not-so-radical Radical policy which stopped short of endowing him with confiscated land, or with any other means to real self-support. Even Radicals believed that with a grade school education and the

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

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CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE AND NEGRO EMANCIPATION

by

Ralph Moellering

● "The contemporary racial crisis is brought into historical relationship with the slavery crisis of one hundred years ago. This is scientifically sound. There is a genuine cultural and ideological connection between slavery and desegregation, and the manuscript is an extended account of the record of the churches in the field of race relations. The record of the churches is related to their growing new sense of responsibility, and to concrete proposals as to how their responsibility may be met.

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In the midst of the current social revolution, many thoughtful Christians are uncertain of themselves. What position —and action—should they take in race relations? Whom should they believe? What does the church say? This book deals with a commodity desperately needed at this time: facts as opposed to myths. The author challenges the myth that the white southerner is to blame for the entire racial problem in this country, and explores and exposes the northerner's involvement in the racial complications of our day. Urbanites and suburbanites are being drawn into the problem through the integration of neighborhoods, churches and places of business. In the light of these developments it is necessary to recognize that the present Negro drive for equality is not an "invasion" of the white man's rights.

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ballot, the freedman (like any American) was bound to rise despite white hostility and the cultural drag of his desperately inadequate preparation for responsibility. (At this point the warning signals should be sounding loud and clear for the civil rights movement of 1965.)

Reconstruction legislatures did increase tax burdens, but in part because they assumed certain educational, welfare and rehabilitative burdens which had formerly been discharged (or ignored) by plantation owners. While votes were indeed brazenly bought for franchises, land grants and bond issues, these plums went to corporations which included many distinguished Southerners among their directors or beneficiaries. (One learns much about a corrupt society by looking at the briber as well as the taker.)

Finally, Stampp sees the "redemption" of the South as due to something less than a spasm of outraged national morality. Rather it came about because of an erosion of the national will to maintain a great and costly social experiment in the midst of profitable temptations. It was "good business" to turn public resources over to farmers, lumbermen, mining companies and railroad promoters, but not to appropriate a portion of the national revenue to the regeneration of 4 million ex-slaves. It was "constitutional" — and cheap — to restore "home rule" to Southern states, even if their governments were not fully representative. It was even "sound politics" to welcome back Southern Democrats, once enough of them turned out to like tariffs and subsidies as much as Grant Republicans. (The Dixiecrat-GOP coalition of economic thinkers, not unlike the National Association of Manufacturers, was forged long before New Deal days.)

The obvious question which remains is why the original Reconstruction portrait has been so sweepingly redone by today's historians. What are the general changes in outlook which form the framework of the revisionist view?

For one thing, the scholars who have risen in the historical profession since 1950 are less nationalistic, in an old-fashioned sense, than their predecessors. Yesterday's teachers saw American history as a steady and triumphant development of the nation, indivisible. The Civil War and Reconstruction era was therefore a horrible setback, a chaotic squiggle in the upward curve on the graph of progress. One can almost feel the older narratives struggling forward toward 1877 with a yearning for the return of "normalcy" equal to that of Warren G. Harding. Contemporary historians are less likely to share this discomfort with a supposedly malfunctioning national organism. Ironically, they are probably less vexed by Confederate separatism than by the bad cause — slavery — which evoked it.

Next, the revisionist is a sadder and wiser man than his forebears of a half century ago. He has supped on too many horrors to believe that the temporary disfranchisement of the planter class was, in the words of Burgess, "the most soul-sickening spectacle that Americans had ever been called on to behold." In the nearly thirty years since the Civil War in Spain, which began when most of today's full professors were teen-agers, we have seen brutalities practiced upon the politically defeated which raised the threshold for sickening the soul out of sight.

In addition, the young or middle-aged history Ph.D., who has grown up since the New Deal, finds little to quarrel with in the story of a once-revolutionary assumption of power by the federal government, or in the experimental social engineering represented by Reconstruction's attempt to treat the Negroes as wards of the nation—as, for example, by the creation of the Freedmen's Bureau, a short-lived agency for relocating, feeding, educating (and sometimes politically organizing) the uprooted slave population.

Trained in a close rapport with the analytical tradition of the contemporary social sciences, the modern academic historian is also disinclined to pontificate about the immutable principles supposedly violated in Reconstruction. He is apt to talk about multiple hypotheses, parallel analogies, or even model structures. He sees no heroes and villains, but rather status aspirations, group conflicts, divergent value norms, ideologies, structures, sectors. He schematizes much less than those before him in the profession who looked for regularities and sequences by the light of Darwin and Marx. He is content with eddies and turbulence instead of smooth, irresistible tides.

Yet to this apparent value-neutralism there is one all-important exception, the revisionist attitude toward the Negro. The new historians

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of Reconstruction have shed the racist anthropology and apologetics of the old school. Living amid the Negro revolution of the sixties, they write with a sympathy for the slave and freedman long absent in white scholarship. Stampp frankly concludes with the statement that it was "worth a few years of radical reconstruction to give the American Negro the ultimate promise of equal civil and political rights." (As a footnote, let the record show that while this essay was in preparation, some forty historians of the United States, including many of the writers herein mentioned, joined in the final phase of the march from Selma to Montgomery, and pledged themselves to help fulfill that long-unkept promise in the very shadow of the Confederacy's first capital.)

But there is a final paradox. The framers of the "tragic legend" were not mossbacks in their own generation. They regarded themselves as innovators, "scientific" historians overthrowing the moralistic version of the Civil War's consequences enshrined in books written by the Republican Party's founders. They wanted to destroy the "mythology" which made Lincoln the Great Emancipator, and the Southerners "traitors." Their racism rested on what was accepted in their time as up-to-date biological learning. Some of them dabbled (perhaps unwittingly) in the psychoanalytic approach to history as they probed for the "hidden" motives behind the expression of Radical ideals. Others thought that in unmasking the supposed economic purposes of Radicalism, they were boldly revealing the machinery of self-interest which moved the clockwork figures of public life. Still others worked out of a sophisticated theory of interfactional compromise as the keystone of American political life, which they believed to have been flouted in principle, and at great cost, during a period of unilateral Northern Republican rule.

In short, they were not so far removed, after all, from aspects of the liberal tradition in American thought. Their progressivism simply stopped short of a deep concern for the underprivileged of the "wrong" race. And it is precisely in the area where they refused to moralize—in the matter of the Negro — that their "hard-boiled" followers of today have reasserted ethical imperatives and regained heights for historical moralism. The makers of the tragic legend, thus, were once revisionists and have suffered the inevitable fate (as Stampp is aware) of being themselves revised.

So it is bound to happen, given time, to the work of today's scholars. Yet what happens to a school of historians is not as important as is the kind of social climate in which they flourish or fade. The significant question is whether the nation itself, educated to a more reasonable view of Reconstruction's aims and shortcomings, can carry the push for equality to a worthy conclusion this time, or whether we will all again fall short of America's best visions.

The Gospel According to Bonn

THIS GERMANY: The Story Since the Third Reich. By Rudolf Walter Leonhardt. New York Graphic Society. 275 pp. $7.95.

Paul Wohl

Rudolf Walter Leonhardt, the author of *This Germany*, is a German journalist who was in his early twenties at the end of the war and today is cultural editor of the liberal West Germany weekly *Die Zeit* and German correspondent of *The Guardian*. *This Germany* (*X-Mal Deutschland*, in the original) is a best seller in West Germany. Its theme is the Germany beyond partitions, the Germany which "has existed for at least twelve hundred years," a Germany "which is not dependent on boundaries or governments." Most of it is written in the form of a discussion with a group of apparently well-heeled, international friends who accompanied the author through the Federal Republic and into one corner of East Germany. Beginning as a cultural and ideological dialogue, the book turns into a political essay and ends as a travelogue. Urbane, witty, written with that deliberate sophistication which postwar German writers have developed in contact with Britain, America and France, the book conveys an accurate picture of the thinking of the liberal wing of the Bonn Establishment. The translation is almost flawless.

But the title *This Germany* is provocative and gives the game away. The

Paul Wohl is East European specialist of The Christian Science Monitor.



HERE, at last, is Frantz Fanon's fiery manifesto — which in its original French edition served as a revolutionary bible for dozens of emerging African and Asian nations. Its startling advocacy of violence as an instrument for historical change has influenced events everywhere from Angola to Algeria, from the Congo to Vietnam — and is finding a growing audience among America's civil rights workers.

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THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH

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book's subject is the Bonn Federal Republic, not the Germany which "existed for at least twelve hundred years" regardless of "boundaries or governments." This originally "cultural," then "folk"-oriented and political, notion flourished in pre-Nazi German literary magazines and made Hitler's Greater Germany palatable for part of the intelligentsia. This greater Germany of the last 1,200 years would have to include Austria, the Sudetenland and Alsace-Lorraine. As a West German "man of culture" with liberal and pacifist leaning, the author limits himself to the frontiers of the 1937 Reich. But once the vision of a Germany "which is not dependent on boundaries or governments" has been reintroduced, other authors at a more propitious time, possibly Mr. Leonhardt himself, may extend their literary-political wanderings to this Germany "beyond boundaries or governments."

Shorn of its literary frosting, *This Germany* is an apologia for Bonn's position. We are told that the Oder-Neisse line is unbearable. "Beyond this line lies one-fourth of Germany —Pomerania, West and East Prussia and the old Hanseatic City of Danzig." East Germany is defined as "this Soviet State." Using official Bonn terminology, East Germany is also termed Middle Germany; the real East Germany apparently is deep in Poland. Here is Mr. Leonhardt on related issues: "Probably none of the leaders of (German) industry wanted Hitler's war. . . . The equation of National Socialism with anti-Semitism" should be "recognized as deceptive and dangerous." When the author is asked by one of his traveling companions: "Are you trying to say that there never was and isn't now any anti-Semitism in Germany?" he answers blandly, "That's about it." In the years between 1933 and 1945, he "personally did not meet a single fanatic Jew-hater. . . . Very probably nine out of ten Germans didn't know what was really going on in the concentration camps."

Americans who have traveled in West Germany are familiar with this line. Not everyone in West Germany accepts it. The opposition includes such men as physicists Max Born, Karl Friedrich von Weizaecker (both Nobel Prize winners), historian Golo Mann, Pastors Niemoeller and von Hammerstein; the latter, the leader of a group called "Aktion Suehnezeichen," whose members with their own hands helped to restore the cathedral of Coventry and are building schools in Israel. But they are in a small minority. The author of *This Germany* could not hold his present

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

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BOY GRAVELY. Iris Dornfeld. Alfred A. Knopf. $4.95.

The odyssey of a young musician. Miss Dornfeld's hero — something of an autistic genius—exists where the verbal cannot reach, yet the author finds a language for his world. Softly, evenly and with humor, the novel fulfills its promise with extraordinary tact.

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position, nor would his book enjoy popularity in the Federal Republic if he belonged to these groups.

Bonn's now almost formal claim to the Reich's frontiers of 1937 (on which, we are told, it may compromise with Poland, once the principle is recognized) is as ominous as was the claim of several pre-Hitler German Governments that the peace treaty of 1918 was not valid because based on "the lie of Germany's war guilt." Mr. Leonhardt takes other liberties with history. Having gone to school in Nazi days, he does not seem to know that membership in the Hanseatic League (a medieval political and commercial city confederacy) did not necessarily make a city German. If membership in this league made Gdansk (or Danzig, as the Germans call it) German, then Göteborg in Sweden and the ancient Russian city of Novgorod also would have to be German. Gdansk and Sopot actually were under the Polish crown for many hundred years, even though in the past century the German element began to prevail. The author may not know, and German school books always hid the fact, that until the turn of the century, even in Breslau, the capital of Silesia, German businessmen, in their dealings with customers from surrounding towns and villages, found it advisable to have Polish-speaking sales personnel. Yet few people would claim that these once Polish territories were returned to Poland for historic or ethnographical reasons. The reason was a political and moral one of an exceptional nature, just as Hitler's crimes were of an exceptional nature. If the Second World War had been just another war with winners and losers, the Nuremberg war trials would be without foundation. Because unprecedented crimes had been committed, unprecedented expiation was needed.

The only case halfway similar to the transfer of Germany's eastern territories to Poland, and to the expulsion of the remaining German population, was the expulsion of the Greek population of Asia Minor by Turkey in 1923, after King Constantin I's unsuccessful attempt to push the Turks back into the interior of Anatolia. In contrast to the Germans in the formerly Polish territories of Eastern Europe, large Greek settlements had existed in Asia Minor since Biblical days. The Greeks, expelled from their ancestral homes to the impoverished mother country in Europe, suffered far more hardship than the Ger-



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mans who left Poland for West Germany. Yet no responsible Greek writer ever demanded their return to Asia Minor, or dealt nostalgically with a contemporary Greece "independent of boundaries and governments."

Another of Mr. Leonhardt's unfortunate mistakes is his contention that previous divisive frontiers inside Germany always separated the north from the south. The modern German language itself characterizes an east-west divide, based on the Saxon German spoken by Martin Luther as opposed to the Rhinish German which today survives only in Alemanic Swiss, and to an extent in Dutch and Yiddish, since the Jews spoke the medieval Rhinish idiom before fleeing to Poland.

Another east-west line shown on the 17th- and early 18th-century maps divides the Saxons and the Prussians. At one time Saxon principalities extended right across central Germany from the Bohemian border to the vicinity of Brandenburg and Hamburg. On the map this dividing line disappeared only after the prince-electors of Brandenburg, later kings of Prussia, pushed the Saxons back and consolidated their possessions. The Prussians, stern and haughty, with their black and white flag, "are in love with death," wrote Georges Clemenceau, who knew them well. The politically less successful and less military-minded Saxons, with their cheerful orange, white and green flags, cultivated life and art. Prussia fostered Krupp; the Saxon Duke of Weimar protected Goethe. Eighteenth- and early 19th-century Berlin was austere, while Dresden was infused with baroque splendor.

In the consciousness of the people, the contrast between Saxons and Prussians has survived. For example, in 1962, this writer had an opportunity to interview a prewar acquaintance, the leading clergyman of a historic town in what before the war was called the Prussian province of Saxony. The old pastor was on the eve of his retirement. I asked him what the members of his congregation really thought about the East German regime. As a Brandenburger he never fully could understand his congregation, he answered, despite forty years of ministry among them. "These Saxons are different," he said, "they have a Slavic streak; one never quite knows what they think." One of the peculiarities of the Communist-ruled (East) "German Democratic Republic" is precisely the renascence of the Saxons. West Berliners angrily call the East German border guards "those Saxons." Traveling for three months up and down East Germany, I found that a majority of officials and managers speak German with a Saxon chant. East German President Walter Ulbricht's heavy Saxon accent is the butt of many jokes. The Saxon chant or drawl was much ridiculed in Prussian Germany before the war. In present-day East Germany it is almost more frequently heard than the German spoken in Hanover or Frankfurt.

Another deeper division between East and West is the social complexion of the G. D. R. The people who run this new republic, whether administrators, party secretaries, directors of schools or engineers come from an entirely different stratum than their counterparts in the West. Almost all are children of factory workers, sharecroppers, farm hands, menials, or the most poorly paid lower officials and employees, all of whom would have had little chance to study or rise under the old regime. Again the Saxons play a crucial part. Prewar Saxony was a dense industrial region, much of it with low labor productivity and much unemployment. Its workers almost to a man belonged to Socialist unions. Communists and left-wing Socialists were especially strong in Saxony, and the many organized Saxon workers who did not turn Nazi suffered the brunt of Hitler's repressions. Those who were not incarcerated in concentration camps remained unemployed or shifted to poorly paid occupations. When Hitler's state collapsed, most of the old timers, especially in the lower brackets, turned toward the Communist-led Socialist unity party, and their children, who were given an opportunity to study, became the mainstay of the new regime. Almost everyone in a position of responsibility in East Germany, born between, say, 1920 and 1930, belongs to this stratum, and the trend continues. More than half of the students in East German universities are children of manual workers and peasants. According to official figures, the proportion of this group in West German universities is 5 per cent.

In contrast to West Germany, East Germany is a poor country. The rich agricultural areas now are Polish, settled by Poles. There are almost no natural resources. The quality of the large brown coal reserve is steadily deteriorating, making its processing more costly. There is very little water power. According to Bonn, East Germany paid more than $6 billion reparations. West Germany, in various ways, received "reparations." The introduction of a Socialist system in a country with a middle-class mentality was bound to be a painful process, especially since this "socialism" in its initial stages followed a foreign model.

Everything considered, it is not astonishing that so many people left East Germany for the West; it is astonishing that so many stayed. Those who have remained and did not flounder in utter bitterness, have had to develop an ideology to rationalize their way of living and to give a moral justification to their existence. This ideology is either Socialist or Christian or a blend of the two. Socialism, officially condoned, is the dominant line of thinking. In the view of Dr. Niemoeller and quite a few West German theologians, Christianity, while in a minority, is a more potent force in East Germany than in West Germany.

There are many other differences between East and West Germany. Mr. Leonhardt seems to be informed of none of them. The title of an objective book describing the situation as it exists today and is likely to continue for some time would be "These Germanys," as it has been through most of history.

Belief in Blood

THE CRISIS OF GERMAN IDEOLOGY: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. By George L. Mosse. Grosset & Dunlap. 337 pp. $5.95, $2.65 paper.

NAZI PROPAGANDA. By Z. A. B. Zeman. Oxford University Press. 226 pp. $7.

Hans Kohn

Without World War I Leninism would not have triumphed in Russia. Lenin's rise to power was not the irrevocable outcome of Russian history; his victory was conditioned by Russia's defeat in the war, the breakdown of governmental authority, and the shortsightedness of Russia's allies who were determined upon keeping Russia in the war. Nevertheless, the authoritarian

Hans Kohn is the author of The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation *(Scribner's).*

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trends of Russian history and the messianic expectation widely accepted among parts of the Russian intelligentsia were significant contributing factors. These millenary hopes for a perfect and just order—not only for Russia but for mankind—seemed to find their "scientific" confirmation in Marx's interpretation of history. The timeless element of myth in Marx proved stronger than his time-bound economic theories. Lenin's reinterpretation of Marxism was based upon specific Russian conditions, the social structure of a backward agrarian country in which the people had only very recently and very slightly been touched by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, or by the advances of technology and the demand for a government based upon the consent of the governed.

A similar view can be held for the rise to power of Hitlerism in Germany. Without World War I and defeat (the causative element was the unexpected and "unmerited" defeat, not the Versailles treaty following the defeat), Hitler would have had as little chance to triumph in Germany as Lenin in Russia. Yet National Socialism was as specific a German phenomenon in the post-1914 industrial mass age as National Liberalism was in Germany's post-1870 society. Both had in common a strong emphasis on "national" as opposed to Western liberalism or socialism. German liberalism would not have turned into "national" liberalism without Bismarck's success in 1866. Similarly, the triumph of National Socialism was brought about by general conditions, yet it was deeply rooted in Germany's social structure, which even in 1914 represented a semi-feudal scale of values at variance with the modern industrial development of the country. These pervasive German traditions explain the enthusiastic acceptance of Hitlerism by the intellectuals and the masses alike; 1933 was seen as the fulfillment of the hopes and promises of 1813 and 1871. German historians and the public opinion which they helped to shape did not stress the Western-influenced revolutions of 1848-49, which were suppressed in Saxony and in Baden by Prussian troops, as the significant events in 19th-century history. They proclaimed 1813, 1871 and 1914 as the manifestations of the "true" German spirit, in all of which the Prussian army was decisively involved. The "revolution" of 1933 was seen as their continuation, but "purified" of all "alien" strains and thus truly German and destined to last.

This German ideology, of which Hitler became the spokesman, was an overstatement and oversimplification of particularly German values and ideas; the promise of their realization was what attracted so many "good" Germans—normal citizens and youthful "idealists." In his important new book, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, George L. Mosse draws attention to one important element in this complex of values and ideas, the *völkisch* element, and traces its growth from 1873 to 1933, using source material largely unknown to the non-German public. The wealth of documentation is one of the outstanding features of this book.

Nationalism in the West remained on the whole rooted in the spirit of the 18th-century Enlightenment, based upon a rational, political order of liberty and equality. Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, especially its Germanophile and Slavophile trends, emphasized pre-Enlightenment, pre-rational foundations—ancient folk traditions, common descent or the *Volksgeist*, the folk spirit. These nonpolitical criteria created an ethnic-linguistic nationalism, which differed from the territorial, state nationalism in the West and which claimed to correspond to the spontaneous or instinctive ancestral community, the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The spokesmen for the folk community rejected, often with contempt, the Enlightenment and political, rational ties based upon law and extolled a transfigured national past with its ancient traditions and beliefs. They envisaged a perfect folk community in which the individual would be fully himself only as an integral part of the folk. They replaced modern self-determination and mobility with determination by ancestry and adherence to the ancestral soil. The folk community was interpreted as an organic and unique collective personality, a manifestation of the divine. It claimed as its own all its "natural" members, whatever their political loyalty or citizenship, and demanded their submission to the call of the blood and their "return" to their ancestral soil. Individuals or groups of different ancestry were regarded as "aliens" who could not become true members of the folk community.

National Socialism was part of the general Fascist movement characteris-

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

Pleasure in her candid recollections deepens on each rehearing. We have, in sum, a living Eleanor Roosevelt—to supplement (and perhaps correct, as only a voice can) the endless biographies to come.

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tic of Central and Southern Europe after World War I. This fascism was an authoritarian protest against the individual liberty, the civilian character and the equality of modern times. It was the reassertion of a hierarchical society based upon military and feudal values. What distinguished German fascism from Italian or Spanish fascism was the emphasis on its *völkisch* character.

This *völkisch* thought goes back in Germany to 1812. Ludwig Börne and Heinrich Heine complained bitterly about it. The leading literary critic of the 1830s and 1840s, Menzel, emphasized it. It gained rapidly in influence during the 1870s and 1880s and triumphed after 1914. Writers like the novelist Jakob Wassermann and the philosopher Konstantin Brunner wrote of the dominant folkish anti-Semitism in the literary circles and the universities in the early 1920s, and clearly foresaw its later development into a national obsession. National Socialism was part of this *völkische Bewegung* (movement); it claimed all people of even distant German descent wherever they lived as *Volksgenossen* (fellows in folkdom) and its leading newspaper was *Völkischer Beobachter*.

In 1879, Wilhelm Marr founded the first explicit "Anti-Semitic League," and in 1880 the philosopher Eugen Dühring, in his *The Jewish Question*, linked Jewish cultural and ethical depravity to inherent racial traits. He opposed the assimilation of the Jews and claimed, as did all racists, that Jews could never become Germans. Jews, having different ancestors, must remain "aliens" in Germany and Europe and should establish their "own" nation in their "own" land.

Before 1914, and above all after 1918, German universities in Germany and Austria were the strongest bulwark of this past-bound, ancestral nationalism. Germany's dilemma of a backward political order and an advanced industrialism created a revolutionary situation. Professor Mosse sees Hitler's real success in his ability to transform the revolutionary grievances of a large sector of the German population into an anti-Jewish revolution. "In his deft and ingenious distinction between Jewish and German capitalism, Hitler saved the capitalist structure of Germany from sure ruin and preserved it." But his anti-Semitism was not simply an opportunist device for attaining power or saving capitalism. "It was precisely because it was a sincerely held belief whose dynamism succeeded in holding the nation spell-bound that Hitler could steer his party to victory." Grounded in the mysteries of blood and organic cultural identity, the anti-Jewish revolution claimed to defend and restore German creativity and not simply to preserve the *status quo*.

Völkisch ideology represents an important part of the Nazi creed, but there were other elements, too. Z. A. B. Zeman stresses in his well-documented *Nazi Propaganda* the anti-Communist aspect of Nazi ideology. In their effort, before 1939, to make their regime appear respectable abroad, the anti-Communist crusading spirit of Nazi ideology and propaganda was most useful. Anti-Semitism, which "was manipulated to satisfy the psychological needs of the Germans," made no great propaganda impact in the West. The Nazis, "by grossly exaggerating the communist threat," were more successful in impressing upon some Western circles that Hitler who had "saved" Germany from communism could easily do it for Europe. Goebbels founded an Institute for the Scientific Research of the Soviet Union and a periodical, *Contra Komintern*, with the subtitle *Kampf Organ der anti-bolschewistischen Weltbewegung* (Fighting Organ of the Anti-Bolshevik World-Movement). The title was continually changed, reflecting the state of Soviet-Nazi relations, until June, 1941, when the German Government returned to branding Bolshevism as the main enemy of the human race and to contrasting the depths into which Russia had fallen with the heights Germany had achieved.

Nazi propaganda was helped by Germany's apparent success from 1934 to 1942. Its victories were proclaimed as the irrefutable proof of German ideals. The war against Russia, which Germany started in June, 1941, was depicted as a war against subhuman beings to protect European civilization. In his "Order of the Day" on October 2, 1941, Hitler stated that "this enemy does not consist of soldiers but to a large degree only of beasts."

These two books will recall and clarify for the new generation of readers the main issues in the great war of a quarter of a century ago. But in different forms and under changed circumstances some of these issues are alive even today. Thus, these books are of more than historical interest.

Directions

Light those two candles
of scented earth-colored wax.
They were a gift.
Let them burn down in broad saucers to
mouths of volcanos, cold
solid ripples that melted once,
once were bright and gave out
immeasurable heat, and gave off
exploded grains of a strange odor.
Let them stay there
until someone gives us new candles.

Emmett Jarrett

RECORDS

Benjamin Boretz

BRAHMS: The Four Symphonies. Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra; Herbert Von Karajan, cond. DGG SKL 133/36 (S).

Symphony No. 3. Cleveland Orchestra; George Szell, cond. ML 6085; MS 6685 (S).

My remarks on the deterioration of the Berlin Philharmonic under Von Karajan, made in connection with its complete recording of the Beethoven Symphonies (*The Nation*, Nov. 9, 1963), were received with outraged incredulity by some readers of this column. But although its playing on these new recordings of the Brahms orchestral music is considerably less disastrous —with the result, for one thing, that the works being performed are recognizable, as was not always the case with Beethoven—the basic observation holds, and on essentially the same grounds: the solo and ensemble wind playing is catastrophically weak in the most fundamental orchestral respects, ensemble attacks and balances are consistently unreliable, there tends to be an unsettling discontinuity of sound-quality at contrasting dynamic levels and textural densities, and Von Karajan's conceptual contribution is restricted to capricious changes of tempo that are obtrusively "interpretive" in their confusing disruptions of Brahms's continuity. In particular, the wind playing reveals a really remarkable lack of minimal discipline and competence: each player has developed eccentric timbral mannerisms that are not only irritat-

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ing in themselves but completely antithetical to any unitary ensemble (the flute's hooty vibrato and the overtremulous oboe are particularly disconcerting). The result is that doublings and combined wind passages disintegrate, and dovetailed lines emerge as unrelated successions.

In this regard, a particular consideration of the Third Symphony, which was recently recorded also by the Cleveland Orchestra under George Szell, is revealing. At the very opening of the first movements, for example, the sonic contrast is unmistakable: Von Karajan's orchestra is heavily overbalanced at the registral extremes, the middle that is so essential in the generation of Brahms's special rhythmic and linear inflections is unclear and undifferentiated, the loud *tutti* is strained and coarse, and the only dynamic distinction seems to be from very loud to very soft, with no relation between the sound of the one and the other. Where the score indicates (at m. 609) a textural change to *leggiero* in the string and wind figuration, nothing changes: accents are as heavily marked as before, and in general the minimum amount of overall timbral differentiation projects an unarticulated sameness that is only underlined by the fluctuating accelerations (particularly the one that winds up and charges into the beginning of the development) of which none is indicated either explicitly or contextually by the score. And after the typically thin and quavery playing of the crucial horn solo (at m. 101), the hyperaccelerated tempo is drastically decelerated where the score asks for "*poco* sostenuto." This exaggeration of large-scale tempo change also destroys the manifold internal rhythmic subtleties whose perception depends to a large extent on a continuously coherent large frame of metrical reference; but even where this is maintained, subtle accentual shifts are dealt with rather perfunctorily (see mm. 168-180 for a particularly scrambled passage). The fortissimo ensemble brass playing (such as at m. 188) is remarkably messy, too, and in general the balance of voices seems continually haphazard—individual sounds are always popping out of the texture, seemingly unwilling to keep their proper places in the ensemble, and constantly threatening to burst the bounds of coherent single-ensemble sound into a crazy quilt of competing timbres.

These problems are even more conspicuous in the third and fourth movements, from the exaggerated hold on the first note of the famous third-movement tune to the senseless acceleration before its repeat, the renewed accelerando at m. 28 in which the basses accelerate a little behind the others, and the ritard before the third statement (at m. 45)—in fact, every reprise of this theme appears to be in a different tempo! The one for solo horn (at m. 98) is perhaps the real nadir, toneless and unarticulated, seeming more like a muted trombone played offstage than the sound that is most central to Brahms's concept of orchestral sonority. And in the last movement, many of the rhythmic complexities are seriously mismanaged; some attacks are so uncoordinated that they take two full eighth-note beats to complete (see m. 90), the crucial triplets are perennially uneven and inaccurate (especially m. 149), and even the final chord seems about to come unhinged with gaps like glaring "white" spaces appearing in the sonorous fabric.

In the Cleveland recording, on the other hand, the sound-quality and articulative sharpness are immediately striking; there is a remarkable sense of sonic continuity through all the timbral and dynamic changes, in which "loud" is a relative degree on a continuous scale beginning from "soft" and not a matter of noise, intensity, or strain toward the limits of sonority. And the sensitivity of the Cleveland ensemble to rhythmic differentiations, the clarity of figurational polyphony and temporal coordination — a precision in which releases are as accurate as attacks so that one is suddenly aware of them as a crucial articulative dimension that hardly seemed to exist before—project a completely different world of music making. Moreover, it is precisely in the individual distinction and remarkable ensemble of its wind playing that the Cleveland Orchestra must be considered the superior of any other functioning ensemble; in this sense, perhaps, comparisons are almost invidious, but all the more significant for the perceptive listener. Notice in the two recordings, for example, the woodwind doubling and counterpointing in the second theme of the first movement, especially the sparkle of the Cleveland ensemble staccatos next to the Berlin thud; the precisely intoned and phrased Cleveland unisons at mm. 55-58 that realize the Brahmsian concept of orchestral chamber music; instead of Von Karajan's hurtling accelerations, Szell's coherent progression into and through the development; the cascading dovetailed woodwind arpeggios, like a continuous thread of sonority at m. 160 in the Cleveland recording, and the lucidity of the ensemble playing that follows; and the wonderful fast and total cutoffs from loud tutti attacks (and string pizzicatos) that leave some real articulative space (a full quarter-note space of silence at m. 194 in contrast to the persistent sonic overhang in the Berlin performance). In the second movement, compare the Cleveland horn's entrance *into* the ensemble with the sense of its imposition *onto* it in the Berlin recording, and the beautiful solo wind playing, and the sense that each "entrance" is merely the point at which an already present instrument begins

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"speaking"—as well as the way the tempo is sustained, held and controlled throughout, so that the big rhythmic change where the woodwinds and strings are antiphonally counterpoised (m. 41) makes the real relational point next to the preceding accentuations. In the third movement, the triplet figuration is part of the foreground sound that binds all the timbral changes together; and the triplets in the last movement as well are suddenly clear as part of the same idea (because accurately played), so that the building down at the *diminuendo* coda (which also takes place through triplet figuration) becomes a genuine resolution of the entire work's structural issues. However, my one reservation about the Cleveland performance arises at this point: the overemphasis of the third in the final sonority seems to me a strangely perverse denial of the chain of thought and association out of which it arises after so much lucidity and care.

SCHUMANN: Symphony No. 2; Genoveva Ouverture. Berlin Philharmonic; Rafael Kubelik, cond. DGG 138955 (S).

The Schumann Second Symphony, that most complex, difficult, subtle and fully realized of Schumann's large orchestral works, is conceived by Kubelik with a massive simplicity that blurs almost all its small-scale inflections, leaving the work to project only its broadest—and least interesting—level. In this sense, Kubelik's is less than half a performance; his insensitivity to dynamic variation is extreme: he hears throughout only two elements, a top, "main" line to which everything else that happens is "accompaniment"; and he encourages some brass-band playing in the finale that brings to the fore the Teutonic tendencies in Schumann that one would most like to submerge. Aside from the (anticipated) bad oboe playing in the slow movement solo, Kubelik is efficient enough in eliciting what he conceives, but he has simply discovered none of what makes this piece worth playing. The *Genoveva* overture is chiefly remarkable for one of those wonderful Schumann introductions that are often, as here, so much more promising than the movement they deliver.

BEETHOVEN: Symphony No. 1; Symphony No. 2. Cleveland Orchestra; George Szell, cond. Epic LC3892; LC3892 (S).

The Cleveland Orchestra plays the first two Beethoven Symphonies as well as it plays Brahms, but the problem is that the pieces are so much less interesting — neither of them is especially eventful or far-reaching, and outside of a few exploratory ramifications in orchestral accentuation (particularly in the Second, which is otherwise the most unvaried and limited of all Beethoven Symphonies in material and sound, with similar motives always similarly articulated and orchestrated at every reference) they essentially reconstruct familiar Haydn-Mozart procedures and sonorities. Still, the precision playing at high speeds in the third and fourth movements of No. 2 is undoubtedly worth hearing for the sheer orchestral virtuosity, but one wonders how such mistakes as the second-movement horn miscue at m. 45, and the late entrances of the basses at 190 and of the oboes at 194 got past the editing sessions.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1103

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 and 11 Evidently what a doctor should have causes a tense condition at times. (8, 5, 7)
10 A literary social quality hung top-to-bottom? (2-5)
11 See 1 across
12 Will one of a famous band? (Possibly a bad mark permitted, but rather bright.) (7)
13 A worker in the building, and in France in the current movement.
14 Prohibits. (7)
15 Set aside restraint? (7)
16 In making an aggressive move re a tray of food, one might. (7)
20 One might expect a cordial reception at this island. (7)
23 Five, set incorrectly about the table, if loaded! (7)
24 With a piece of paper leaving all but the square part of it? (7)
25 Planned to turn the card over? (7)
26 Should one consider everything soulful? (7)
27 May imply a lack of observation, certainly not counting the live ones. (4, 9)

DOWN:

2 A center of discord for what they sometimes do to crime. (7)
3 The definition might sound as though one gets such a mark underseas. (7)
4 The sound of charges composes the answer. (7)
5 Were Romans used to one getting through in Rome, after a fashion?
6 Attains a position of success. (7)
7 One isn't expected to retain the shell, though I suppose one might bounce! (7)
8 What a politician occasionally does, or the late comic character almost every morning? (4, 3, 6)
9 You might say you are about to, when all you want is a temporary filling! (6, 2, 5)
17 Ran up, and possibly seen about to catch something. (7)
18 If so, might one need room? (7)
19 Related work by the member that usually walks? (7)
20 A cat-o'-nine-tails might return to an earlier production figure. (7)
21 Such leather is logically red. (7)
22 The lark's is such a call, according to Henley. (7)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1102

ACROSS: 1 Ensilage; 5 Ironic; 10 Darns; 11 Army nurse; 12 Van Gogh; 15 Slugger; 18 Lustful; 21 Mascot; 24 and 16 Standing-room only; 26 Charmer; 27 Interpose; 28 Ionic; 29 Garish; 30 Deployed. DOWN: 1 Endive; 2 Sprinters; 3 Lesions; 4 Graphed; 6 Rondeau; 7 Norma; 8 Cheaters; 9 Smiths; 17 Flashing; 19 Fedoras; 20 London; 21 Machete; 22 Spaniel; 23 Braced; 25 and 13 After the fact.

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